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Abstract
A recent theoretical paper by Leonard Mlodinow and Todd Brun suggests that the functioning of
physical records or “memories” is never accompanied by a decrease in entropy, meaning that all memories
“align” with the thermodynamic arrow of time. In this thesis, we characterize a class of physical systems
as memories in terms of inferences that can be made about the state of the world, given certain information
about these systems. Tools from Bayesian probability theory are used to quantify the informativeness and
reliability associated with such inferences. Based on consideration of two model systems, one classical and
one quantum, we argue in favor of Mlodinow and Brun’s claim that the functioning of memory systems
is conditioned by thermodynamic constraints. For the classical model, we show that a memory which
operates against the thermodynamic arrow, and thus “remembers” a relatively high-entropy state, is
much less informative than a similar memory which aligns with the thermodynamic arrow. Our analysis
of the quantum model, expressed in the density matrix formalism of quantum mechanics, allows us to
consider the inferences that can be made when a quantum system is coupled to a simple type of quantum
memory system. We ultimately show that these inferences can be expressed in terms of a probabilistic
matrix completion problem.
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1 Questions and Motivation
1.1 Introduction
There is an extensive scientific canon which posits a link between the second law of thermodynamics, which
describes the increase in thermodynamic entropy over time, and physical memories, or systems which record
information. Researchers have made the case for such a relationship from a range of perspectives. Some,
like psychologist Ryan Smith, approach memory from a neurological standpoint: Smith has noted that the
micro-scale processes which are the building blocks of human cognition rely on a predictable increase in
entropy.10 Others have considered the brain and other memory systems as computing systems, and have
investigated how the physical instantiation of logical operations is constrained by thermodynamic effects.
For example, the famous “Landauer’s principle” states that every erasure of a bit, or “clearing” of a bit of
memory, entails a net increase in entropy of kB ln 2.
7 Some authors, such as Lorenzo Maccone, have even
searched for a connection between memory and entropy in quantum physics. Maccone has argued that the
physics of quantum systems makes it so that all processes which leave a “trail of information” cannot be
entropy-decreasing processes.8
The goal of this thesis is to explore how the reliability of a physical record is conditioned by the existence
of a thermodynamic arrow of time. Our analysis was inspired by the 2014 work of Leonard Mlodinow and
Todd Brun, who argued that physical systems can only function precisely and reliably as memories of the
thermodynamic past.9 That is, if a memory accessed at a time t1 reveals information about the state of the
world at another time t2, then the entropy of the memory and its surroundings at t1 must be higher than
the entropy at t2, in order for the memory to be reliable or “robust.” In our Universe, where all isolated
subsystems so far observed exhibit a common thermodynamic arrow of time, this result implies that all
memory systems share a common “directionality” in time which aligns with our intuitive, human distinction
between the past and the future.
Mlodinow and Brun’s analysis is motivated by the property of time-reversal invariance, a characteristic
possessed by many modern physical theories, including quantum mechanics and special relativity. The
mathematical structure of such theories does not pick out a certain direction in time as obviously past
or future. Rather, this temporal ordering is imposed by users of these theories, who already possess a
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definite notion of past and future. The question of how our world, governed by such time-symmetric laws,
could nevertheless appear so asymmetric when we compare one direction in time to the other, is known as
Loschmidt’s paradox. Mlodinow and Brun’s analysis aims to address Loschmidt’s paradox in the particular
context of memory systems. That is, they propose an explanation for why all systems that function as
memories only appear to operate in one direction of time, despite the underlying time-symmetric dynamics
of these systems.
Our contribution to Mlodinow and Brun’s work has been to develop two simple models, one classical
and one quantum, that we believe can help clarify and extend their analysis. In the remainder of Chapter
1, we offer some theoretical background and motivation for our work, and characterize the terms of the
research question more precisely. In particular, we introduce our interpretation of memory as a type of
probabilistic inference. This reasoning is applied to a classical model system in Chapter 2. We consider
a simple stochastic system of marbles moving between two urns, and show that the informativeness of a
“memory-type” inference about certain properties of the marble system is contingent upon changes in the
entropy of the system over time. In Chapter 3, we explore a model quantum memory system with a similar
approach. Using the density matrix formulation of quantum mechanics, we investigate how inferences about
the state of a quantum system are conditioned by observations of a memory device coupled to the system.
Chapter 4 concludes our investigation, and highlights some possible avenues for future work. Finally, in
Appendix A, we present an overview of the theory of Bayesian probabilistic inference, and in Appendix B
we give an introduction to the density matrix formalism.
1.2 Memory as inference
To begin our investigation, a concrete definition of a physical memory system is essential. Here, we wish
to understand the category of memories as a broad class of “record” systems, so as to include any system
which can function as a record or repository of information about the world. Accordingly, this conception of
memory systems encompasses systems like the human brain or computer memories, which can be understood
as specifically evolved or designed for the function of recording information. But it also extends beyond
these straightforward cases. For example, we would also like to identify objects like fossils as a record of this
type, because when given an observation of a fossil’s physical properties, we can reasonably extract a wealth
of information about the distant past. Of course, the possibility of accessing this information also hinges
upon a background of prior information and a pre-existing theoretical framework, which includes scientific
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knowledge of geological processes, evidence from similar fossils, and an understanding of biological evolution.
So we wish to define a class of “memory systems” in terms of the information about the world which
might be inferred from observation or analysis of such systems. With this conception of memory in mind,
we put forward the following working definition of a memory system. In this work, we classify a physical
system M as a memory of a second system S if:
Given some knowledge of the state or properties of M at some time t1, some inference about the state of
S at another time t2 can be made with high confidence.
Two important aspects of this characterization of a memory system immediately stand out. First, this
definition suggests that memory systems come in degrees, with the reliability of the memory scaling with the
confidence that can be placed in the relevant inferences being made. Indeed, almost any system might qualify
as a potential memory under this criterion, although the inferences made based on most such systems will be
so uninformative as to be practically useless. Although our definition does not provide a strict dividing line
between memories and non-memories, it does leave open the possibility that similar memory systems might
be compared, based on the relative confidence associated with the inferences they allow.
Second, under this definition, the status of a system as a usable memory depends not only on the raw
physical constitution of the memory and its environment, but also on the logical procedure of inference.
Of course, the types of inferences which can be made about the world based on a memory will be heavily
constrained by physical interactions between the memory and its surroundings. However, we will argue that a
purely physical account of memory systems, which does not introduce some notion of inference, is insufficient
to account for a range of common systems which function as useful memories.
We emphasize here that our conception of inference should not be construed as an exclusively human
activity. Rather, we understand inference as an abstract logical procedure, which could potentially be em-
bodied in a range of physical systems. A system which instantiates an inference procedure take inputs which
encode relevant information about the world, processes this information with a set of physical operations
corresponding to logical rules, and then produces a physical result associated with this processed informa-
tion. Consequently, any system capable of encoding and manipulating information in this way could perform
inferences about memory systems. Of course, one example of such a system is the human brain, but systems
like artifical neural networks and some non-human animals are also capable of inference in this sense.
Proceeding with this definition of memory suggests two related objections. First, why should we even
introduce a concept like inference into our definition of a memory? Surely, there must be some way to appraise
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a system as a memory solely in terms of its physical properties, without interpretation through an inferential
procedure. Second, even if such a definition of memory is put forward, how could it possibly be made precise
and unambiguous, given that the state of a single physical record may imply different conclusions under
different logical frameworks for inference? We have already noted, for example, that the inferences which
could be made about a fossil specimen are heavily conditioned by relevant evidence and scientific knowledge.
Though a physical system may, in practice, function as a memory for one observer but not another, this
seems to be only a contingent fact about when and how the memory is accessed, and not a rigorous criterion
by which we might distinguish memories from non-memories.
In addressing the first objection, we argue that a definition of memory without some notion of inference
would exclude a broad class of systems which, intuitively and practically, we think of as memories or records.
This is because many memory systems, particularly those at a macroscopic scale, function probabilistically
as memories. That is, these systems work well as memories not because they deterministically record the
state of the world with perfect fidelity, but because we judge them to be reasonably reliable under certain
conditions. The presence of noise and outlying data does not prevent us from categorizing our experimental
instruments as memories; these errors simply temper our trust in these devices. In these cases, it may be
difficult or practically impossible to determine whether, in any particular instance, a system acts “properly”
as a memory or whether it malfunctions. However, this limitation does not rule out the possibility of building
probabilistic theoretical models of these memory systems, which can provide an incomplete and yet useful
account of how such systems operate and record information.
Allowing for a probabilistic conception of memory systems is particularly important in the present work,
given that we aim to describe memories in the presence of the thermodynamic arrow of time. As we will
explain in the next section, results from statistical mechanics suggest that the changes in entropy which
determine an arrow of time emerge only statistically: It is not that an observable decrease in entropy is
physically impossible, but only that it is extremely unlikely. If we wish to properly account for memory
systems which exhibit a thermodynamic arrow of time, we must be able to articulate a meaning for memory
in this probabilistic context.
Making this notion of probability more precise will help to address the second objection, concerning the
dependence of inference on background information and a pre-existing logical framework. In this work, we
follow the Bayesian approach to the assignment and interpretation of probabilities. In the Bayesian formu-
lation of probability, a numerical probability quantifies the degree of certainty that can be associated with
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the truth or falsity of a given inference. These probabilities are assigned, not observed, based on information
relevant to the inference and on requirements of logical consistency. In this way, the Bayesian probability
calculus functions as a generalization of standard two-valued formal logic, appropriate for scenarios where
incomplete information prevents a definite assignment of “true” or “false” to specific claims.
The logical groundwork of Bayesian probability theory is described in more detail in Appendix A. How-
ever, for our present purposes, what is most important to note is that although Bayesian probabilities must
be assigned with respect to given prior information, these assignments are done in a systematic and logically
consistent manner. To begin with, Bayesian probabilities are constrained by the same basic mathemati-
cal axioms that all other theories of probability must satisfy. For example, all probabilities must respect
countable additivity, which requires that the probability of observing any of a set of mutually exclusive out-
comes is simply the sum of the probabilities of the individual outcomes. However, for any given problem
to which Bayesian analysis is applied, certain considerations may not only limit the possible probabilities
that an observer might assign, but may single out a unique probability assignment as appropriate for the
situation. These considerations may have to do with relevant prior information, symmetries of the problem,
or constraints related to the rationality or self-consistency of the logical procedure.
But this type of formalism is exactly what we need in order to sharpen our notion of inference. For if
the information gathered from a memory system allows some inference to be made about the world, then
the tools of Bayesian logic make it possible to assign a probability to the truth value of this inference. This
probability quantifies the degree of certainty associated with the inference, and therefore quantifies the extent
to which the memory system functions as a useful memory. The most functional and reliable memory systems
will permit precise inferences, with associated high probabilities.
So although we acknowledge that any memory inference will depend on relevant prior knowledge and on
a given logical framework, Bayesian probability theory allows us to treat this information in a consistent and
systematic way. In some instances, the relevant probability assignments can be entirely determined by the
given information, combined with constraints of logical consistency encoded in the Bayesian formalism. In
these cases, the inference procedure prescribed by Bayesian logic is, in a sense, the only reasonable way to
perform inference, since any other method may lead to inconsistent results.
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1.3 Thermodynamics and memory
Given this notion of memory as a form of inference, we can now begin to sketch an outline of our investigation.
In this work, we aim to analyze memory-type inferences in the context of a thermodynamic arrow of time:
A monotonic change in entropy over some period of time. In existing memory systems, this arrow invariably
points in the same direction: All known memory systems are records of a past which had a lower entropy
than the present. This suggests that entropy changes in a memory system or its surroundings may condition
the inferences that observation of a memory system permits. We will argue that memory inferences in the
traditional sense, which refer to a low-entropy past state based on observation of a high-entropy present
state, can be made much more precise and reliable than the reverse.
In setting the framework for this argument, it is important to be clear about the particular notion of
entropy which we refer to in speaking of an “arrow of time.” Entropy is a rich concept, with distinct yet
related meanings in thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, and information theory. Although colloquially
understood as a measure of disorder, the precise definitions of entropy in various fields do not always align
with this popular conception. In our analysis, we make use of the statistical mechanical Gibbs entropy,
defined as follows.
Suppose a classical system can be measured as having certain macroscopic properties, such as a definite
temperature or a given energy. Although these measurements tell an observer something about the state of
this system, they do not specify its state completely. A full account of the microscopic configuration of a
classical system would consist of knowledge of the positions and velocities of every constituent particle of the
system; this is clearly a practically unreachable goal. However, certain microscopic configurations that are in
principle possible might be incompatible with the given macroscopic measurements, and other configurations
might be judged as more or less likely in light of these measured quantities. In defining the Gibbs entropy,
we consider the set or “ensemble” of all microscopic configurations which might possibly give rise to the
observed macroscopic measurements. If we define pi as the probability that the i
th state in this ensemble is
the actual microscopic configuration of the system, then the Gibbs entropy S is expressed as
S = −kB
∑
i
pi ln pi. (1)
This definition assumes that the ensemble contains a countable number of configurations; in the case
of an uncountable ensemble, this sum must be replaced with an integral. If we assume further that the
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ensemble has some finite number of states Ω, then we can consider the special case where all these states
are equiprobable, such that pi = 1/Ω. This probability assignment then yields an especially simple form for
the entropy, S = kB ln Ω. In this simplified formula, the Gibbs entropy appears as a measure of the number
of possible microscopic configurations that a system could conceivably attain, given certain macroscopic
knowledge or constraints.
In the quantum mechanical case, the Gibbs entropy is generalized as the von Neumann entropy, which is
defined in terms of the density operator ρ which describes the system of interest. The von Neumann entropy
takes the form
S = −kBTr
[
ρˆ ln ρˆ
]
, (2)
where the symbol Tr signifies the trace operation, and the operator logarithm ln ρˆ can be computed in terms
of a power series. As described in more detail in Appendix B, the density operator ρˆ contains information
about the probabilities associated with the possible outcomes of measurements on a quantum system.
A fundamental result of statistical mechanics, demonstrated in a variety of proofs with varying degrees
of generality, is that any decrease in the Gibbs or von Neumann entropy of an isolated system with many
interacting degrees of freedom has vanishing probability.2,4,5,11 Loosely speaking, this result emerges because
in a system with a large number of microscopic components, there are far more configurations of the system
which correspond to high entropy states than to low entropy states. This fact is manifest in our simplified
expression for the Gibbs entropy, S = kB ln Ω, where the entropy scales logarithmically with the number of
possible microscopic configurations Ω . Therefore, if a system starts in some low entropy state, a very large
fraction of the states it could potentially evolve into have higher entropy.
The “thermodynamic arrow of time” points in the direction of this increase in entropy. Although the
proof of an arrow of time in statistical mechanics is a probabilistic one, the probabilities involved are so
close to unity for macroscopic systems that the increase of entropy can be treated as a practical certainty.
Technically, we have only sketched an explanation for the increase of the statistical mechanical entropy,
not the thermodynamic entropy, which can be computed from measurements of temperature and heat flow.
However, it is a standard conclusion in statistical mechanics that these two entropies coincide for simple
thermodynamic systems, so for our analysis working with the statistical mechanical entropy is sufficient.5
With this concept of entropy clearly defined, we can now outline the goals of our analysis in the following
two chapters. In this work, we study two model memory systems, one with classical dynamics and the
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other with quantum dynamics. In Chapter 2, we introduce our classical model, a probabilistic system which
is a modification of the “urn problem” from introductory probability theory. This urn model lends itself
to a certain class of memory inferences, in which observation of some property of the system allows an
inference to be made about another property of the system at a different time. Using the framework of
Bayesian probability theory, we can compute the probabilities associated with this class of inferences. These
probabilities act as a metric for the reliability of inferences: A useful, informative memory system will allow
for a sharp probability distribution to be assigned over the possible values of a recorded observable. We
pay special attention to cases where the entropy of the urn system changes over time. Analysis of these
cases allows us to describe how the urn model memory is conditioned by a thermodynamic arrow of time, as
identified by a sustained increase in entropy.
For the quantum model, we consider a pair of coupled quantum systems, an abstract memory system
and an observed system which is coupled to the memory system. In Chapter 3, we characterize and analyze
this model in terms of the density matrix formalism of quantum mechanics. We consider a simple form of
coupling between the two systems which permits straightforward memory inferences, and then investigate
how measurement of the state of the memory system informs an observer about the possible states of the
recorded system.
1.4 Prior work of Mlodinow and Brun
The original impetus for this project was a 2014 paper, “Relation between the psychological and thermody-
namic arrows of time,” written by physicists Leonard Mlodinow and Todd Brun.9 In their work, Mlodinow
and Brun attempt to explain the direction of the “psychological arrow of time,” that is, the temporal di-
rection in which memory devices function, as a consequence of the direction of the thermodynamic arrow.
They argue that any useful memory system exhibits a property they term “generality,” and then go on to
show that any memory system with this property must operate in the same direction as the thermodynamic
arrow. In Mlodinow and Brun’s analysis, a memory that satisfies generality is one which does not have to
be “fine-tuned” to a particular state in order to record each possible outcome. In the remainder of the first
chapter, we present a summary of Mlodinow and Brun’s approach, and argue that our inferential account of
memory systems can supplement their work.
To motivate their work, Mlodinow and Brun begin with a brief note on time reversal invariance. Except
for during certain uncommon processes, the microscopic dynamics of both classical and quantum systems
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are adequately described by mathematical formalisms which are invariant under time reversal. That is, the
equations which govern the time evolution of these systems do not change form when the time variable t is
replaced by −t. This mathematical symmetry has a physical consequence: Given any possible sequence of
states that a system could move through during its evolution, there exists another possible evolution through
that same set of states, but in the opposite temporal order. For certain simple systems, this claim seems
plausible. A ball thrown in an arc through the air could certainly, in principle, be thrown again so that it
moves through the same arc but in the opposite direction. But for most events, this consequence of time
reversal invariance flies in the face of everyday experience. It seems ridiculous to suggest that the existence
of an egg shattering implies that an egg could spontaneously reassemble itself, or that a drop of dye diffused
in water might be suddenly concentrated back into a dense point. These processes appear to us as clearly
“one-way” or irreversible, whether they occur naturally or with the help of human intervention.
This apparent paradox can be resolved by recourse to the second law of thermodynamics. From the
perspective of statistical mechanics, the second law tells us that processes during which the entropy of a closed
system decreases, although not disallowed by the laws of physics, are nevertheless extremely improbable. This
means that although we may observe a range of entropy-increasing processes, the time-reversed versions of
these processes are effectively impossible due to the entropy deficit that they would generate. Mlodinow
and Brun’s suggestion is that this asymmetry in time can be used to explain another asymmetry, namely
the fact that memory systems only operate as memories in one direction of time. In their view, it is not
just a contingent fact that all memory systems function in the same direction of time, but rather a physical
consequence of the universal existence of the thermodynamic arrow of time.
As in this thesis, Mlodinow and Brun’s notion of a memory is very general, intended to include any system
which can function as a record of the state of another system. However, to develop their argument, they
first focus on a simple model system that captures the basic content of their result. Mlodinow and Brun’s
model system consists of two canisters of a classical ideal gas, and a microscopic rotor or “turnstile” placed
inside a nozzle which connects the two canisters. This rotor has M possible positions, labeled by the integers
0 to M − 1, and Mlodinow and Brun define a variable r(t) which corresponds to the rotor position at any
particular time t. The nature of the rotor is such that whenever a gas particle moves from left to right, the
position of the rotor increments by one, while a flow of particles in the opposite direction causes the rotor to
decrement. A diagram of this setup is given in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Diagram of Mlodinow and Brun’s gas-rotor model memory system. The microscopic configuration
of the gas is determined by specifying the position and momentum of each gas molecule. The state of the
rotor is specified by the variable r(t), which increments or decrements by 1 whenever a gas molecule passes
from one canister to the other. This image is a modified version of a figure that appears in Mlodinow and
Brun’s 2014 paper.9
Given these dynamics, Mlodinow and Brun then introduce a memory “readout” function fread(r(t)),
which tracks the net number of particles that have passed from left to right between a time ti and another
time t. This function is defined as
fread(r(t)) = r(t)− rref , (3)
where rref ≡ r(ti) is the position of the rotor at the reference time ti, and ti < t. As expressed in this
function, Mlodinow and Brun’s model system has been constructed so that the rotor position r(t) encodes
information about the evolution of the gas. In this way, the rotor functions as a memory of changes in the
distribution of gas particles between the two canisters. However, Mlodinow and Brun argue that there is no
reason that the dynamics of the system cannot be interpreted in a different way, as encoding a record of how
many particles will pass from left to right between two times t and tf , where tf > t. Such a “memory” of
the future could be expressed in terms of a second readout function,
f ′read(r(t)) = r
′
ref − r(t). (4)
In this case, r′ref ≡ r(tf ) is the position of the rotor at the final reference time tf . At this stage, there is
no compelling reason to deem (3) to be a valid memory readout, and at the same time deny the validity of
(4). No characteristic of the system singles out a particular direction in time as “past-like” in any way; the
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classical nature of the system insures that the dynamics completely respect time-reversal symmetry. Indeed,
our choice of the particular time variable t to track the evolution of the system is somewhat arbitrary, in the
sense that the temporal direction in which it increases has no special significance. If we were to re-describe
the system in terms of the alternate time variable −t, (3) would then appear as a memory of the future. The
point here is that no absolute notion of past or future is encoded in the dynamics of the gas-rotor system
itself, although observers may impose a convenient time variable in order to track the system’s evolution.
However, a definite time asymmetry, and therefore a notion of past and future, does emerge for certain
evolutions of Mlodinow and Brun’s model. Consider a scenario in which at some reference time, the distri-
bution of particles between canisters is highly asymmetric. For example, there might be far more particles
of gas in the left canister than in the right. In such cases, experience tells us that gas will rush into the right
canister from the left, until a uniform gas density has been achieved across the two canisters. Specifically,
this result is a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics, since the asymmetric distribution at the
reference time has a lower entropy than an even distribution. Although this low-entropy condition at the
reference time does not guarantee an evolution to uniform gas density, the difference in entropy between the
two states does make this evolution extremely likely. This preference for trajectories that increase entropy
defines the gas-rotor system’s thermodynamic arrow of time. In the context of such a tendency, referring to
a state of the system as in the ”past” of another state simply means that the first state has a lower entropy
than the other.
It is under these conditions, when the model system exhibits a thermodynamic arrow of time, that a
salient asymmetry between the two memory readout functions (3) and (4) becomes apparent. To understand
this distinction, Mlodinow and Brun introduce the concept of “generality.” If a memory system satisfies
generality, then it must be capable of recording more than one possible state of the world, without having
to be set specifically to record each possible state. For Mlodinow and Brun, a memory which does not meet
this criterion is hardly a memory at all: For example, they note that if a digital camera required a new chip,
specific to each scene, in order to take a photograph, the camera would be of little use as a memory in the
first place. Requiring memories to satisfy generality insures that memory systems are not correlated with
other systems due to some special “fine-tuning” of the memory state, but due to a definite interaction with
the world that reliably effects the memory system.
Armed with the generality criterion, the essential difference between the memory readouts in (3) and (4)
can now be explained. Assume that the system exhibits a standard thermodynamic arrow of time, so for
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two times t1 < t2, the entropy of the system at t1 is lower than at t2. In the case of the standard “past
memory” as defined by the readout in (3), this means that the readout at any time t > ti will be associated
with an increase in entropy between ti and t. To impose the generality condition for this memory, we need
to understand how the memory would record different possible states. Consider the exact microscopic state
of the gas at ti, which can be specified in principle by listing the positions and velocities of all its constituent
particles. If the memory satisfies generality, then the readout function fread(r(t)) given in (3) ought to still
function as a record if this microscopic state differed slightly from its true value. Indeed, this is the case. If we
imagine perturbing the system at ti in this way, as long as we perform this perturbation so that rref = r(ti)
remains unchanged, fread(r(t)) would still offer an accurate account of the flow of gas particles between ti
and t. The exact evolution of the rotor may be slightly different, but this is exactly what we want, since
we wish to show that the memory can record multiple possible outcomes. In addition, we see that for such
perturbations, the arrow of time we have postulated is generally preserved. This is because although we
have altered the microscopic state of the gas at ti, this microscopic state still corresponds to a low-entropy
state of the gas. In Figure 2, several possible evolutions of fread(r(t)) are displayed for a low-entropy initial
condition, all of which exhibit a definite arrow of time.
Figure 2: Schematic plots of several possible evolutions of the memory readout function fread(r(t)), given
a low-entropy initial condition at t = ti. Each of these trajectories corresponds to a different microscopic
perturbation of the gas, such that rref = r(ti) is left unchanged. All of them exhibit a well-defined arrow of
time in the direction of increasing t.
For the “future memory” expressed in the readout function f ′read(r(t)) in (4), the situation is quite
different. Here, if we want to consider the possible states that this memory could record, we can imagine
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a similar perturbation of the microscopic state of the gas, this time at tf . Again, as long as we do not
change the value of r′ref = r(tf ) in this perturbation, the record encoded in f
′
read(r(t)) will still remain valid,
although the particular value that is read out at t may change. However, we find that upon making such
perturbations, the thermodynamic arrow of time we originally proposed will generally be destroyed. This
is because, by assumption, the entropy of the gas at tf is larger than at any time t < tf . But the second
law of thermodynamics tells us that given this entropy at the boundary time tf , the entropy at any other
time t is almost certainly higher, which contradicts our assumption. So in attempting to define a memory in
terms of the function f ′read(r(t)), we are forced to conclude that if a thermodynamic arrow of time does exist
for the system, it will generally lead us to identify the time tf with the thermodynamic past. This effect is
demonstrated in Figure 3, where we plot a number of possible evolutions of f ′read(r(t)) from a high-entropy
final state, most of which do not pick out an arrow of time in either direction.
Figure 3: Schematic plots of several possible evolutions of the memory readout function f ′read(r(t)), given
a high-entropy initial condition at t = tf . Each of these trajectories corresponds to a different microscopic
perturbation of the gas, such that r′ref = r(tf ) is left unchanged. Most of these evolutions do not exhibit a
significant arrow of time.
In our view, this argument proposed by Mlodinow and Brun is essentially sound. However, we claim
that without some understanding of memory as a type of inference, some aspects of their proposal remain
unclear. The difficulty appears when we try to clarify what is meant by a “generic” evolution of the gas-rotor
system. In their work, Mlodinow and Brun claim that a generic evolution of the model system exhibits
an arrow of time if, for the vast majority of trajectories possible given some constraints, there is a similar
change in entropy over the course of the evolution. First of all, in classical physics, the number of possible
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trajectories that satisfy certain conditions will in general be uncountably infinite, since classical systems
can exhibit a continuous range of position and momentum values. But more importantly, this metric based
on some “number of trajectories” cannot account for probabilistic constraints, which might suggest that
certain evolutions are much more likely than others. Indeed, this is precisely the type of constraint that
a thermodynamic arrow of time imposes: To say that a system has a thermodynamic arrow of time does
not necessarily disallow decreases in entropy, but means that such evolutions of the system are extremely
unlikely. In order to precisely account for the probabilistic nature of memory systems in a thermodynamic
context, our contribution in this thesis is to bring the tools of Bayesian inference to bear upon the problem.
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2 A Classical Memory Model
In this chapter, we introduce a modified version of the urn problem from standard probability theory, as a
prototypical example of a classical memory system. The dynamics of this model are simple enough to permit
a full analytical treatment of the relevant probabilities, and they allow for a straightforward demonstration
of how a thermodynamic arrow of time can emerge purely from statistical considerations. We demonstrate
that in the urn model, memory inferences are most informative when made about the thermodynamic past,
such that they refer to states of relatively low entropy.
2.1 Characterization of the model
In the urn model, we consider a pair of two urns, labeled arbitrarily as “right” and “left,” and a set of N
marbles distributed between them. Defining the variables NR(t) and NL(t) respectively as the number of
marbles in the right and left urns at some time t, we have the constraint NR(t) +NL(t) = N . The dynamics
of the system are as follows: At each of a set of discrete times t = ... − 2,−1, 0, 1, 2..., a single marble is
removed from one of the urns, and placed into the other. The selection of each marble is “random” in the
sense that an observer of the system has no knowledge of the mechanism by which individual marbles are
selected. To display the evolution of the system over time, we introduce a sequence of quantities {σi|i ∈ Z},
where each value σi corresponds to the i
th time-step. The elements of this sequence are defined so that
σi = +1 if a marble is moved from right to left at time t = i, and σi = −1 if a marble is moved from left to
right. So, for each time-step from t = i to t = i+ 1, the distribution of marbles (NR(t), NL(t)) undergoes an
evolution of the form
(NR(t), NL(t))→ (NR(t+ 1), NL(t+ 1)) = (NR(t)− σi, NL(t) + σi). (5)
Now, suppose that this system is coupled to a device, the function of which is to record and display the
net number of marbles that have moved from right to left, between some reference time t = 0 and another
time t = n. Given the definition of the quantities σi, the output f(n) of this “memory register” will be a
sum of all values of σi between t = 0 and t = n,
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f(n) =
n−1∑
m=0
σm. (6)
The evolution rules expressed in (5) and (6) describe all of the observer’s knowledge of the dynamics
of the system. It is important to note that at this stage in the characterization of our urn model, it is
not physically meaningful to define either direction in time as “past” or “future.” Nothing in the general
dynamics of the urn system itself singles out a direction of time as obviously past or obviously future. Out
of a desire to provide a definite temporal label to each marble swap, we are compelled to define some time
variable t which increases in a particular direction. But the direction affiliated with this choice of labeling is
no more meaningful than associating “up” on the Earth’s surface with positive values of a height coordinate.
In fact, if we specify a suitable summation convention for how to evaluate the sum in (6) for n ≤ 0, then we
can track the evolution of the memory register for t = −1,−2,−3... as well.
However, introducing a concept of entropy for the urn system will allow us to define an arrow of time
for particular evolutions of the marble distribution. The statistical entropy associated with this system, for
any distribution of marbles (NR(t), NL(t)), is computed as S = kB log Ω, where Ω the number of possible
configurations of marbles which would produce that given distribution. For example, in the extreme case
where NR(t) = 0, there is only a single way to achieve this distribution, simply by placing every marble
in the left urn, and so S = kB log 1 = 0. The entropy S = kB log Ω is simply a special case of the Gibbs
entropy in (1), where we have assumed that all configurations are equiprobable. In the general case, there
will be multiple ways to obtain the desired distribution. Suppose we wish to arrange the marbles in the
distribution (NR(t), NL(t)). Given N marbles, this means we must choose NR(t) marbles out of the total N
to place in the right urn. But there are Ω = N !/(NR(t)!(N − NR(t))!) = N !/(NR(t)!NL(t)!) ways to make
this choice, each corresponding to a different configuration of marbles which has the same overall distribution
(NR(t), NL(t)). The entropy S of the system for this distribution is then just
S = log
(
N !
NR(t)!NL(t)!
)
= logN !− logNR(t)!− logNL(t)!, (7)
where we have set kB = 1. If NR(t) and NL(t) are very large, we can apply Stirling’s approximation to each
term in (7). We find that the entropy per marble S/N is effectively a function of the relative fractions of
marbles, NR(t)/N and NL(t)/N , in the right and left urns, and is given by
18
S/N ≈ −NR(t)
N
log
(
NR(t)
N
)
− NL(t)
N
log
(
NL(t)
N
)
. (8)
In Figure 4, this expression is plotted as a function of NR(t)/N alone, which we can compute since
NR(t)/N + NL(t)/N = 1. Inspecting this plot reveals that the entropy drops to zero when either the right
urn or the left urn is completely empty, at NR(t)/N = 0 and NR(t)/N = 1, respectively, and that it reaches
a maximum when the marbles are evenly distributed at NR(t)/N = NL(t)/N =
1
2 . So, for a given time
evolution of the marble distribution, we would associate a thermodynamic arrow of time with this evolution
if there is a strong tendency for the system to progress from an unevenly distributed state to a balanced
state. We will see such a tendency for evolutions for which the urn model begins in a low entropy state.
Figure 4: Plot of the approximate entropy per marble S/N , given in (8), as a function of NR(t)/N . S/N
reaches a maximum at NR/N =
1
2 , which corresponds to an even distribution of marbles between the two
urns.
2.2 Memory inferences in the urn model
Now that the physical properties and dynamics associated with the urn model have been defined, we can ask
questions about the various “memory-type” inferences which can be made about the urn model. Specifically,
we would like to know: Given knowledge of f(n), the output of the memory register, at some particular time
t = n, what can we infer about the distribution of marbles (NR, NL) at t = 0?
We can formulate this question in terms of Bayesian inference as follows. Suppose that we define f¯ = f(n)
as the observed output of the register at t = n, and we let NR = NR(0) and NL = NL(0) refer to the number
of marbles in the right and left urns, respectively, at t = 0. NR and NL therefore do not change in time.
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If we are making an inference about the distribution of marbles at t = 0, this means that we would like to
assign probabilities to the various possible distributions (NR, NL), conditioned on the value of f¯ . We denote
these probabilities as
P (NR, NL|f¯ , n,N), (9)
which translates verbally to “the probability that the marbles have the distribution (NR, NL) at t = 0,
conditioned on the knowledge of f¯ , n, and N .” This is a probability distribution over the possible mar-
ble distributions (NR, NL), which expresses our confidence in an inference about the marble distribution.
P (NR, NL|f¯ , n,N) reaches a maximum around the values of (NR, NL) which are most likely, given knowl-
edge of f¯ . Moreover, the informativeness of our inference scales with the narrowness of the probability
distribution around this peak. A tightly peaked distribution suggests that (NR, NL) is almost certainly given
by the peak value, while a broad and flat distribution does not strongly single out any particular values of
(NR, NL).
In order to understand how knowledge of f¯ informs our inference about the value of NR, and thus the
marble distribution at t = 0, we can compute the probabilities in (9) in terms of a Bayesian updating proce-
dure. As described in detail in Appendix A, this procedure derives from the rule for assigning probabilities
to a joint proposition,
P (A,B|I) = P (B|A, I)P (A|I) = P (A|B, I)P (B|I). (10)
Here, the probability P (A,B|I) that the statements A and B are both true is computed in terms of two
factors: The probability P (B|A, I) that B is true, given that A is true, and the probability P (A|I) that A
is true. All of these probabilities are conditioned on the knowledge of some prior information I.
For our inference, we can identify the proposition A with a claim about the distribution (NR, NL) at
the time t = 0, and associate B with the observed value f¯ of the memory register. We take the prior
information I as encoding the values of n and N . By making these substitutions into (11) and then solving
for P (A|B, I) = P (NR, NL|f¯ , n,N), we find the relation
P (NR, NL|f¯ , n,N) = P (f¯ |NR, NL, n,N)
P (f¯ |n,N) P (NR, NL|n,N). (11)
Thus, we can calculate our desired probability P (NR, NL|f¯ , n,N), which we now refer to as the posterior
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distribution, in terms of three other probability distributions. These are:
• The likelihood function, P (f¯ |NR, NL, n,N). The likelihood is the probability that a given value f¯ is
observed as the output of the memory register at t = n, given that a particular distribution of marbles
(NR, NL) is known at t = 0.
• The prior distribution, P (NR, NL|n,N). This gives the probability that the marbles are in the dis-
tribution (NR, NL) at t = 0, independent of any knowledge of the value of f¯ . The prior probability
distribution quantifies our initial state of knowledge concerning the marble distribution, before any
information about the output of the memory register is obtained.
• The normalization, P (f¯ |n,N). This gives the probability that a given value f¯ is observed as the
output of the memory register at t = n, independent of any information about the marble distribution
(NR, NL) at t = 0. The normalization is fixed by requiring that the posterior is a normalized probability
distribution over the possible values of (NR, NL).
We now consider each of these three distributions in turn, in order to understand the behavior of the
posterior distribution. In the calculations that follow, we will use abbreviated notation that suppresses
any dependence on n and NL. For example, we will denote the posterior distribution as P (NR|f¯ , N) ≡
P (NR, NL|f¯ , n,N).
We begin with the likelihood function. To compute P (f¯ |NR, N), we first note that any particular value
of f¯ can be the outcome of a number of different sequences of swaps {σi}. Specifically, whenever a sequence
of swaps occurs such that f¯ = f(n) =
∑n−1
m=0 σm, the output on the memory register will be f¯ . Each of these
possible sequences is a mutually exclusive outcome. Therefore the probability P (f¯ |NR, N) is simply the sum
of the probabilities of obtaining each individual sequence,
P (f¯ |NR, N) =
′∑
P ({σi}|NR, N). (12)
Here, the prime over the sum specifies that the sum only runs over sequences {σi} for which f¯ =
∑n−1
m=0 σm.
Now, the problem of calculating P (f¯ |NR, N) reduces to computing the probability of the system evolving
through various sequences {σi}, which we have written as P ({σi}|NR, N).
To proceed with this calculation, it is easiest to start with a short sequence, and then generalize the
procedure for longer evolutions. Consider the situation when n = 2. In this case, the evolution of the system
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is given by a sequence {σ0, σ1}, where σ0 specifies the direction of the marble swap between t = 0 and t = 1,
and σ1 does the same for the swap between t = 1 and t = 2. The probability P ({σ0 σ1}|NR, N) is then the
joint probability that the first swap corresponds to the value of σ0, and that the second swap corresponds
to the value of σ1. Expanding this as a conditional probability, we find the relation
P ({σ0, σ1}|NR, N) = P (σ0|NR, N)P (σ1|σ0, NR, N). (13)
So, the probability of the sequence {σ0, σ1} occurring is the product of two factors: The probability
P (σ0|NR, N) of attaining the first value σ0 of the sequence, and the probability P (σ1|σ0, NR, N) of attaining
the second value σ1 of the sequence, conditioned on the fact that σ0 is given.
We can assign a value to the first factor, P (σ0|NR, N), by the following logic. Between t = 0 and t = 1,
there are N possible ways in which the system might evolve, since any of the N marbles might be moved
into the opposite urn. To an observer, nothing known about the dynamics we have specified gives any reason
to single out any particular marble; there is a symmetry in the information that the observer has about the
marbles. This suggests that the observer ought to assign an equal probability to each marble being swapped,
because otherwise one or more marbles would be arbitrarily distinguished from the others. Therefore, the
probability of any given marble being swapped must be 1/N , so that the total probability that any of the
marbles is swapped is unity. As described in Appendix A, this justification for a uniform assignment of
probabilities is commonly known as the “Principle of Indifference.”
However, not all of these possible evolutions will produce a given value of σ0. For example, the value
σ0 = +1 could be realized in NR possible ways, since there are NR marbles which could be moved from
the right urn. Since we have assigned equal probability to each of these mutually exclusive possibilities, the
probability that some marble will be moved from right to left is NR/N . But this is just the probability
that σ0 attains the value +1, and so we have P (σ0 = +1|NR, N) = NR/N . By an analogous argument, a
probability of P (σ0 = −1|NR, N) = NL/N ought to be assigned to the claim that σ0 = −1.
Similar reasoning also motivates the probability assignment for the second factor, P (σ1|σ0, NR, N). Here,
it is given that σ0 has some known value. This means that at t = 1, the distribution of marbles has evolved
to (NR − σ0, NL + σ0), and we aim to assign probabilities to the occurrence of σ1 = +1 and σ1 = −1. But
this situation is precisely analogous to our calculation of P (σ0|NR, N): The distribution of marbles at a
given time-step is known, and we must assign probabilities to infer the subsequent value in the sequence
{σi}. Symbolically, we have the identity
22
P (σ1|σ0, NR, N) = P (σ1|NR − σ0, N). (14)
That is, the probability of a left (or right) swap during the second time-step, given that the direction
of the first swap is known, is equal to the probability of a left (or right) swap during the first time-step,
but with the initial distribution (NR − σ0, NL + σ0) instead of (NR, NL). Thus, for σ1 = +1, we have
P (σ1 = +1|σ0, NR, N) = (NR − σ0)/N , and for σ1 = −1, we have P (σ1 = −1|σ0, NR, n) = (NL + σ0)/N .
After multiplying these results by the probabilities we obtained for P (σ0|NR, N), we arrive at the probabilities
associated with each possible sequence {σ0, σ1}:
P ({σ0 = +1, σ1 = +1}|NR, N) = NR
N
NR − 1
N
, (15)
P ({σ0 = +1, σ1 = −1}|NR, N) = NR
N
NL + 1
N
, (16)
P ({σ0 = −1, σ1 = +1}|NR, N) = NL
N
NR + 1
N
, (17)
P ({σ0 = −1, σ1 = −1}|NR, N) = NL
N
NL − 1
N
(18)
For n = 2, the probability of obtaining any value of f¯ can now be computed by summing over the
appropriate probabilities given in (15)-(18), as noted earlier in (12). For example, the value f¯ = 0 will
be observed if either the sequence {σ0 = +1, σ1 = −1} or {σ0 = −1, σ1 = +1} is realized, so we have
P (f¯ = 0|NR, N) = P ({σ0 = +1, σ1 = −1}|NR, N) + P ({σ0 = −1, σ1 = +1}|NR, N).
In the n = 3 case, for which we wish to assign a probability to a sequence {σ0, σ1, σ2}, the generalization
is straightforward. Again, we expand the probability of the whole sequence as a product of conditional
probabilities, as in (13). Only this time, the result consists of three factors, one for each term in the
sequence:
P ({σ0, σ1, σ2}|NR, N) = P (σ0|NR, N)P (σ1|σ0, NR, N)P (σ2|{σ0, σ1}, NR, N). (19)
The first two factors are the same as what we computed for the n = 2 case. The third factor can
be assigned a probability by an argument similar to that used to assign the value of the second factor.
Specifically, the probability of a left (or right) swap during the third time-step, given that the directions of
the first two swaps are known, is equal to the probability of a left (or right) swap during the first time-step,
but with the initial distribution (NR−σ0−σ1, NL +σ0 +σ1) instead of (NR, NL). So in terms of the output
of the memory register f(n), we have the expression
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P (σ2|{σ0, σ1}, NR, N) = P (σ2|NR − σ0 − σ1, N) = P (σ2|NR − f(n = 2), N). (20)
At this point, a definite pattern has begun to emerge. In the general case, for arbitrary n, we expand
the probability P ({σi}|NR, N) of a sequence {σi} as a product of conditional probabilities. Recall that the
probabilities P ({σi}|NR, N) are what we require to compute the likelihood function, as given in the sum
(12). Proceeding with this expansion yields a product of n factors, which takes the form
P ({σi}|NR, N) =
n−1∏
k=0
P (σk|{σi, 0 ≤ i < k}, NR, N). (21)
In this expression, each factor P (σk|{σi, 0 ≤ i < k}, NR, N) is the probability that the value σk will
be realized on the (k + 1)th swap, given that the truncated sequence of values {σi, 0 ≤ i < k} is known
to have been attained on the previous k swaps. But just as in the n = 2 and n = 3 cases, we know that
this probability is equal to the probability of σk occurring on the first swap, given the initial distribution
(NR − f(k), NL + f(k)). Generalizing (14) and (20), we then have the result
P (σk|{σi, 0 ≤ i < k}, NR, N) = P (σk|NR − f(k), N) =

(NR − f(k))/N if σk = +1,
(NL + f(k))/N if σk = −1.
(22)
So, the probability P ({σi}|NR, N) given in (21) is simply a product of factors of the form (NR− f(k))/N or
(NL + f(k))/N , depending on the sign of σk.
In order to simplify our expression for P ({σi}|NR, N) given in (21), we will now assume that the magnitude
of the memory register is always much smaller than N , so that |f(k)| << N throughout the evolution of
the register. This simply means that we take the change in the number of marbles between urns to be much
less than the total number of marbles. Such an approximation implies that the f(k) terms in (22) can be
neglected, yielding
P (σk|{σi, 0 ≤ i < k}, NR, N) ≈

NR/N if σk = +1,
NL/N if σk = −1.
(23)
That is, in the limit where |f(k)| << N , the probabilities associated with each swap are independent of the
results of the previous swaps. This result is intuitively reasonable, given that for very large N , swapping a
few marbles from urn to urn will leave the relative fraction of marbles apportioned to each urn practically
unchanged.
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Now, we can see that under this approximation, each factor in (21) can only have one of two possible
values. For the factors for which σk = +1, we have P (σk|{σi, 0 ≤ i < k}, NR, N) = NR/N , and for the
factors for which σk = −1, we have P (σk|{σi, 0 ≤ i < k}, NR, N) = NL/N . So, if we define nR as the total
number of swaps taken from the right urn between t = 0 and t = n, and nL is the total number of swaps
taken from the left, then (21) simplifies to
P ({σi}|NR, N) =
(
NR
N
)nR (NL
N
)nL
. (24)
Noting that n = nR + nL and f¯ = nR − nL, we can then express this probability in terms of f¯ and n as
P ({σi}|NR, N) =
(
NR
N
)n+f¯
2
(
NL
N
)n−f¯
2
. (25)
Therefore, under the assumption that |f(k)| << N , the probabilities P ({σi}|NR, N) associated which
each possible sequence {σi} are in fact independent of the particular order of the terms σi, and only sensitive
to the net passage of marbles f¯ between urns. This means that all the terms in (12), which sum to give us the
likelihood function, are in fact identical and equal to (25). So to complete our calculation of the likelihood
function, it suffices to determine the number of terms in (12).
Since each term in (12) corresponds to a sequence {σi} for which f¯ =
∑n−1
m=0 σm, the total number of
terms is simply the number of possible sequences of length n which satisfy this constraint. We can deduce
this number by noting that if a sequence of length n produces an output of f¯ on the memory register, then
there were nR = (n + f¯)/2 swaps from right to left during the sequence. These swaps could have occurred
at any time between t = 0 and t = n, and are marked by the values of the sequence for which σk = +1.
Each possible “placement” of right-to-left swaps within the n time-steps corresponds to a distinct sequence
for which f¯ =
∑n−1
m=0 σm. Therefore, counting the number of such sequences is equivalent to counting the
number of ways that we can “choose” nR of the n time-steps to have σk = +1. But this is just the binomial
coefficient
(
n
nR
)
= n!/(nR!(n−nR)!) = n!/(nR!nL!). So, summing the n!/(nR!nL!) terms in (12), all equal to
(25), yields our final expression for the likelihood function,
P (f¯ |NR, N) = n!
nR!nL!
(
NR
N
)nR (NL
N
)nL
=
n!(
n+f¯
2
)
!
(
n−f¯
2
)
!
(x)
n+f¯
2 (1− x)n−f¯2 , (26)
where we have introduced the variable x ≡ NR/N . Note that the likelihood has now taken the form of a
binomial distribution in nR, associated with obtaining nR successes in n trials.
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The first ratio in (26) is an even function of f¯ , corresponding to a symmetric probability distribution over
f¯ which is peaked around f¯ = 0. However, this symmetry is broken by the second pair of factors containing
x, which pushes the maximum of the distribution towards positive or negative f¯ , depending on the initial
distribution of marbles (NR, NL). In this weight provided by these two factors, we can see evidence of an
emergent arrow of time: For asymmetric initial distributions of marbles, we are most likely to see a value
of f¯ which corresponds to a relaxation back towards an even distribution. Furthermore, the longer that we
wait, corresponding to larger values of n, the larger the most likely value of f¯ . This effect is demonstrated
in Figure 5, which shows plots of P (f¯ |NR, N) at x = 34 for various values of n.
Figure 5: Plots of the likelihood function P (f¯ |NR, N) as a probability distribution over f¯ , at x = 34 , for five
values of n. From left to right, the curves plotted are for n = 20 (blue), n = 40 (orange), n = 60 (green),
n = 80 (red), and n = 100 (purple). For the purposes of easy visualization, P (f¯ |NR, N) has been plotted
here as a continuous function, although f¯ can actually only take on integer values.
However, for the purposes of our memory inference, we are most interested in the behavior of the likelihood
as a function of x. This dependence on x determines how the posterior distribution P (NR|f¯ , N) is weighted
relative to the prior P (NR|N), due to the observer’s knowledge of f¯ . Specifically, we would like know the
conditions under which the likelihood is tightly peaked around a particular value of NR. If the likelihood,
and therefore the posterior distribution, exhibits a narrow peak for some value of x, this suggests a high
confidence in the claim that the initial marble distribution corresponded to this value. In Figure 6, we plot
the likelihood as a function of x for various values of f¯ at n = 50, to demonstrate how the location and
sharpness of the peak in the likelihood can vary with changing f¯ .
A contour plot of the likelihood, as a function of x and f¯ , is given in Figure 7. Here, we can see that
26
Figure 6: Plots of the likelihood function P (f¯ |NR, N) as a function of x, at n = 50, for five values of f¯ . From
left to right, the curves plotted are for f¯ = 0 (blue), f¯ = 10 (orange), f¯ = 20 (green), f¯ = 30 (red), and
f¯ = 40 (purple). As in Figure 5, for the purposes of easy visualization, P (f¯ |NR, N) has been plotted here as
a continuous function, although x can actually only take on values that are multiples of 1/N .
the likelihood function exhibits a diagonal ridge of maximum values. Each point on this ridge corresponds
to the peak value of the likelihood as a a function of x, for a given value of f¯ . By taking the derivative
with respect to x of our expression for the likelihood in (26) and setting it equal to zero, we find that these
maximal values lie on the line given by
f¯∗ = 2n
(
x− 1
2
)
. (27)
To understand how the width of the likelihood as a function of x varies along this ridge, we now consider
the limit of large n. Since (26) takes the form of a binomial distribution in nR, for large n we can approximate
the likelihood as a normal distribution in nR, with mean nx and variance nx(1 − x). Proceeding with this
approximation, and then making the substitutions nR = (n+ f¯)/2 and f¯∗ = 2n
(
x− 12
)
, yields the expression
P (f¯ |NR, N) ≈ 1√
2pinx(1− x) exp
[
− (f¯ − f¯∗)
2
8nx(1− x)
]
. (28)
So we see that the likelihood is a normal distribution in f¯ , with a mean of f¯∗ = 2n
(
x− 12
)
and variance
of 4nx(1− x). Expressed in terms of x instead of f¯∗, this becomes
P (f¯ |NR, N) ≈ 1√
2pinx(1− x) exp
−n
(
x− n+f¯2n
)2
2x(1− x)
 . (29)
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Figure 7: Contour plot of the likelihood function P (f¯ |NR, N), as a function of x and f¯ for n = 10. The blue
shading in the upper left and lower right corners corresponds to small values, and the yellow and red shading
along the diagonal ridge corresponds to large values. As in Figures 5 and 6, P (f¯ |NR, N) has been plotted
here as a continuous function in f¯ and x.
This expression for the likelihood is approximately normally distributed in x, albeit with an effective
variance σ2n(x) = x(1−x)/n that depends on the value of x near the peak of the likelihood. We are now in a
position to quantify the informativeness of the inference about x, and therefore the initial marble distribution
(NR, NL). Substituting our expression for the likelihood in (29) into our equation for the posterior distribution
given in (11), we obtain
P (NR|f¯ , N) = 1√
2pinx(1− x)
P (NR|N)
P (f¯ |N) exp
−n
(
x− n+f¯2n
)2
2x(1− x)
 . (30)
The informativeness of this posterior function depends on the width of the distribution over the possible
values of (NR, NL). This width scales with the variance of the posterior, which we denote as σ
2
post. To get
a sense of how the width of the posterior distribution may vary, suppose for concreteness that the prior is
approximately normally distributed, with mean x0 and variance σ
2
prior, so that we have
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P (NR|N) ∝ exp
[
− (x− x0)
2
2σ2prior
]
. (31)
Note that now that the prior is given, we have completely specified the dependence of the posterior on x, and
consequently its dependence on (NR, NL) as well. Computing the normalization P (f¯ |N) is not important
for our purposes, since it does not vary with x, and therefore does not effect the shape of the posterior as a
probability distribution over the possible marble distributions (NR, NL).
For the case of the Gaussian prior, the posterior becomes a product of normal distributions, with variance
given by
1
σ2post
≈ 1
σ2prior
+
1
σ2n
(x0) =
1
σ2prior
+
n
x0(1− x0) . (32)
Here, we have substituted the value x = x0 into the variance σ
2
n(x0) of the likelihood, since the prior
distribution peaks at x0. Supposing that the variance of the prior is fixed, we can consider this expression
for σ2post in two different limits. First, for a given value of x0, if we take n to be very large, to compensate
we must have a small variance σ2post for the posterior. This result tells us that as the number of time-steps
n increases, the inference about the initial marble distribution becomes more informative. Second, we can
look at the behavior of σpost for fixed n, as we allow x0 to vary between 0 and 1. This is the more interesting
limit, as it demonstrates how the informativeness of the inference changes with our knowledge of an arrow
of time.
As x0 approaches either 0 or 1, the likelihood term σ
2
n(x0) in (32) grows without bound. For a value of x0
near these extremes, the prior identifies the state of the system at t = 0 as a low entropy state. In this case,
the magnitude of the likelihood term must be compensated by a small value of σ2post, indicative of a highly
informative inference. This corresponds to a “memory of the past” in the thermodynamic sense, where we
identify the past with a state of relatively low entropy. In contrast, values of x0 near
1
2 yield inferences which
are far less informative for a given value of σ2prior and n, since the denominator of the likelihood term will
be much larger than in the x0 → 0, 1 limit. In these cases, the prior singles out a high-entropy state as most
likely at t = 0. As a result, the relevant inference is not nearly as sharp; we identify this as a “memory of
the future.”
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3 A Quantum Memory Model
Having completed our analysis of the classical urn model, we now move to develop a quantum mechanical
model which will serve as a prototypical quantum memory system. We define this quantum memory to
record the net change in some coarse-grained property of a system which it is coupled to, in analogy with
Mlodinow and Brun’s rotor memory. In order to understand the informativeness of such a memory system,
we consider how a measurement of the memory system at one time conditions inferences about the state
of the coupled system at a different time. This analysis is carried out in the density matrix formulation of
quantum mechanics. Although our work with the quantum memory system is not yet complete, we are able
to show that memory inferences in the quantum model can be expressed in terms of a probabilistic matrix
completion problem.
3.1 Characterization of the model
We consider two quantum systems: A system S, and a record system M which functions as a memory
of some aspect of S. For concreteness, we assume that the Hilbert space of possible states accessible to
S is spanned by some orthonormal basis {|j〉S} = {|j1〉S , |j2〉S , |j3〉S ...}, where the index j takes on values
within some indexing set J. We write j as a boldface index to emphasize that the indexing set J could be
multidimensional. For example, each value of j might correspond to an ordered pair j = (j1, j2), where each
element of the ordered pair is associated with an independent degree of freedom of S. Suppose that for each
possible basis state of S, we can associate a definite integer value of some physical quantity f to this state,
so that the value of f corresponding to the state |j〉S is given by some function f(j).
We define the interaction between S and M so that changes in the value of f(j) can be inferred from
knowledge of the state of M . The function f(j) in this quantum memory model will play a role analogous to
that of Mlodinow and Brun’s readout function fread(r(t)), and that of the memory function f(n) in the urn
model in Chapter 2. That is, just as the functions fread(r(t)) and f(n) do not encode every detail about each
particular state of the gas in Mlodinow and Brun’s canisters, or the location of every marble in the urns, the
value f(j) does not necessarily capture all the properties of a given state |j〉S of S. Rather, these functions
refer to coarse-grained properties of their respective systems, which are insensitive to all the precise details
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of any given state. Often, such properties correspond to average or aggregate quantities taken over a large
number of a system’s degrees of freedom. For example, the total spin angular momentum of a many-body
quantum system is such a coarse-grained quantity, since many different internal configurations of such a
system can correspond to the same net value of the spin.
We can get a clearer sense of the properties of this function f(j) by means of a simple visualization.
Consider Figure 8, which represents a subset of the set of basis states {|j〉S} of S in terms of a grid. Each
square on the grid corresponds to a basis state with a different value of j. In this example, we have assumed
that j = (j1, j2) is a two-component index, so that the degrees of freedom corresponding to j1 and j2 can be
varied independently by moving parallel to one axis or the other. What we see from this representation is
that the function f(j) induces a partition on this set of basis states, with each set in the partition marked
by a different color. States with the same color have the same value of the function f(j), and therefore have
the same value of whatever property f(j) corresponds to. We would like to construct our memory system M
so that it only registers a change when the system S evolves from one coloring in this partition to another,
that is, from one value of f(j) to the next. This is analogous to the memory function f(n) in the urn model,
which only varies when the coarse-grained variable NR changes.
To this end, we consider a memory system M with a set of NM orthonormal basis states {|i〉M} =
{|0〉M , |1〉M ...|NM − 1〉M}, labeled by a quantum number i between 0 and NM − 1. The Hilbert space of the
composite system M ×S will then have a basis consisting of the tensor products of basis states of M and S.
That is, one useful basis of the Hilbert space of M × S is defined by
{ |i〉M ⊗ |j〉S } ≡ { |i〉M ⊗ |j〉S | 0 ≤ i < NM , j ∈ J }. (33)
The coupling between S and M is defined so that when the state of S changes, the change in the value
of the memory quantum number i is equal to the change in the value of the quantity f . To see how this
constrains the time evolution of the composite system M × S, we consider the evolution of a generic basis
state |i〉M ⊗|j〉S in some definite time interval, between some time t = t1 and a second time t = t2. Assuming
that this evolution is defined by the action of some unitary operator Uˆ , it will generically take the form
|i〉|j〉 → Uˆ |i〉|j〉 =
∑
i′,j′
Ui,j,i′,j′ |i′〉|j′〉. (34)
In this summation and in all subsequent equations, sums over a italicized index can be assumed to range
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Figure 8: Visualization of the set of basis states of the system S. Each block corresponds to a single basis
state, and blocks with the same color have the same value of the quantity f(j), as given in the box on the
right. Here, j = (j1, j2) is a two-component index, and each axis corresponds to varying a different degree of
freedom of S, associated with either j1 or j2. A trajectory through this space is illustrated with arrows; the
numbers above the arrows denote how much a memory register coupled to S would increment or decrement
during each step.
from 0 to NM −1 in integer steps, while sums over a boldface index vary over all values in the indexing set J.
Here, we have abbreviated the basis states as |i〉|j〉 ≡ |i〉M ⊗ |j〉S , and the coefficients Ui,j,i′,j′ ≡ 〈i|〈j|Uˆ |i′〉|j′〉
are the matrix entries of this operator in the basis given in (33). These entries cannot take on arbitrary
values, however, since we have specified that any changes in f must be accompanied by equal changes in
the memory quantum number. That is, for each term in (34), the change f(j′) − f(j) must be equal to the
change i′ − i, otherwise the term should vanish. This means that for all nonzero terms in (34), we have
i′ = i+ f(j′)− f(j), and consequently the evolution simplifies to the constrained form
|i〉|j〉 → Uˆ |i〉|j〉 =
∑
j′
Ui,j,i+f(j′)−f(j),j′ |i+ f(j′)− f(j)〉|j′〉. (35)
Since the matrix elements Ui,j,i′,j′ vanish when i
′−i 6= f(j′)−f(j), we can also write this constraint simply
as Ui,j,i′,j′ = Ui,j,i′,j′δi′−i,f(j′)−f(j). Beyond the restriction, we allow Uˆ to be an arbitrary unitary operator.
To be precise, we must note that there is one class of evolutions for which (35) is ill-defined. These occur
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when i+f(j′)−f(j) either falls below 0 or rises above NM−1. These are invalid evolutions, since the memory
system quantum number can only take on NM distinct values. To account for this possibility, we require that
when the memory “overflows” or “bottoms out” in this manner, the memory quantum number will reset back
to 0 or NM−1. This amounts to replacing the expression i+f(j′)−f(j) in (35) with (i+f(j′)−f(j)) mod N .
In the remaining analysis, we will suppress this detail when convenient, since ignoring it will have little effect
on our results.
In order to make the effects of the constraint in (35) more readily apparent, we introduce an ordering of
the basis states of the composite system M ×S. This ordering will allow us to group the matrix entries of Uˆ
into (NM )
2 different blocks, each of which is a sub-matrix in itself that will take a particularly simple form.
Consider the set of basis states {|i, j〉} defined as
{|i, j〉} = { |i, j〉 = |(i+ f(j)− f(j0)) mod NM 〉|j〉 | 0 ≤ i < NM , j ∈ J }. (36)
In this set, j0 is some arbitrary fixed value in J, which we can choose so that f(j0) = 0 if we wish. This set
is in fact the same basis set as defined in (33), only with a new notation to emphasize a particular ordering
of the basis vectors. We can think of these basis vectors as arranged as follows. First, we take all the basis
vectors |i, j〉 with i = 0, and arrange them in accordance with some arbitrary ordering j = j1, j2, j3... of the
values of j in the index set J. These are the first vectors in our ordering. We then place all the vectors with
i = 1 after this first subset, organized by the same ordering of j values as for i = 0. We continue this until
we have reached the subset where i = NM − 1, at which point we have arranged all of our basis vectors. The
complete ordering will take this form:
|i, j〉 = |0, j1〉, |0, j2〉, |0, j3〉... |1, j1〉, |1, j2〉, |1, j3〉... |NM − 1, j1〉, |NM − 1, j2〉, |NM − 1, j3〉... (37)
What does this permutation of the basis vectors correspond to physically? For each value of i, this
arrangement includes a subset of basis vectors that is that same size as the basis {|j〉S} of S. We will call
this the ith block of vectors in the ordered basis. Each basis state |i, j〉 = |(i+ f(j)− f(j0)) mod NM 〉|j〉 in
this block corresponds to a term in the superposition obtained when evolving M × S from the state |i, j0〉.
Ordering the basis elements in this way allows the action of the evolution operator Uˆ to be expressed
in a simple form. The basis states are now separated into NM different blocks, each containing basis states
|i, j〉 with a fixed value of i and all possible values of j. As a result, we can now also think of the matrix
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entries of U as divided into blocks. In our new basis ordering, the matrix elements of Uˆ are defined as
U ′ij,i′j′ ≡ 〈i, j|Uˆ |i′, j′〉, where we have included a prime to distinguish these elements from our original matrix
elements Uij,i′j′ . Consider the set of all such matrix entries for a given value of i and i
′. These entries will
form a contiguous square block, since the ordering of our basis insures that basis vectors |i, j〉 with the same
value of i will be in a single block. This block is itself a matrix, with entries indexed by j and j′. We refer
to this matrix as the block entry of Uˆ at i and i′, and denote it as U ii′ , and we specify its own elements as
(U ii′)jj′ ≡ U ′ij,i′j′ . In terms of these block units, the matrix corresponding to the evolution operator Uˆ in
this basis takes the form
Uˆ ∼

U00 U01 . . . U0,N−1
U10 U11 . . . U1,N−1
...
...
. . .
...
UNM−1,0 UNM−1,1 . . . UNM−1,NM−1

(38)
So far, expressing the operator Uˆ in this form just amounts to a specific ordering and grouping of the
matrix elements of Uˆ . However, we can see that this block matrix will simplify considerably by considering
the evolution of a basis vector |i, j〉 as expanded in the {|i, j〉} basis:
|i, j〉 → Uˆ |i, j〉 =
∑
i′,j′
(U ii′)jj′ |i′, j′〉 =
∑
i′,j′
(U ii′)jj′ |i′ + f(j′)− f(j0)〉|j′〉 (39)
Again, we have suppressed the mod NM operator in |i, j〉 = |(i+f(j)−f(j0)) mod NM 〉|j〉 for brevity. We
can now ask how the constraint expressed in (35), which specifies how the states of the memory system M
co-evolve with the states of S, constrains the terms in this expansion. From (35), we know that a state |i〉|j〉
evolves into a superposition with terms only of the form |i + f(j′) − f(j)〉|j′〉, so that the quantum number
of the memory system state increases by an amount equal to the change in the value of f . This means that
the state |i, j〉 = |i + f(j)− f(j0)〉|j〉 that is evolved in (39) can only evolve into a superposition with terms
of the form:
|(i+ f(j)− f(j0)) + f(j′)− f(j)〉|j′〉 = |i+ f(j′)− f(j0)〉|j′〉 = |i, j′〉 (40)
So, a basis element |i, j〉 under the evolution operator Uˆ evolves into a superposition of only basis vectors
with the same value i. That is, the evolution induced by Uˆ does not send states from one block of our basis
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ordering into another. Specifically, this means that all terms in (39) must vanish except for those for which
i′ = i, and so the entries (U ii′)jj′ are zero unless i′ = i. This simplifies the representation of Uˆ in our ordered
basis into a block-diagonal matrix, where each off-diagonal block element is just the zero matrix 0 with all
vanishing entries. Using the abbreviation U i ≡ U ii for the diagonal elements, we then have:
Uˆ ∼

U0 0 . . . 0
0 U1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . UN−1

= diag(U0, U1...UN−1) (41)
Moreover, the assumption that Uˆ is a unitary operator implies that each of these diagonal block entries
U i is also a unitary matrix. We can see this be computing the product Uˆ Uˆ
† in our ordered basis, which is
equal to the identity operator 1ˆ since Uˆ is unitary. Noting that Uˆ† = diag(U
†
0, U
†
1...U
†
N−1), we can see that
the block entries (Uˆ Uˆ†)kk′ of the product Uˆ Uˆ† are given by
(Uˆ Uˆ†)kk′ =
∑
i
(Uˆ)ki(Uˆ
†)ik′ . (42)
Here, we have performed the matrix multiplication blockwise. In a blockwise multiplication, the block entries
of the product are computed in terms of the block entries of the factors, in the same form as a standard
matrix multiplication. We have denoted the block element of Uˆ with indices k and i as (Uˆ)ki, and the block
element of Uˆ† with indices i and k′ as (Uˆ†)ik′ . We will continue to use this notation in the next section:
Unless otherwise specified, we surround a matrix with parentheses and two indices in order to signify the
block entry of that matrix specified by those indices.
Notation aside, we find that the block entries of Uˆ Uˆ† given in (42) simplify because Uˆ and Uˆ† are both
block-diagonal. Specifically, the sum in (42) collapses to a single term, since (Uˆ)ki and (Uˆ
†)ik′ are equal to
the zero matrix unless k = i = k′. Noting that (Uˆ)kk = Uk and (Uˆ†)k′k′ = U
†
k′ , we have the result
(Uˆ Uˆ†)kk′ = δkk′(Uˆ)kk(Uˆ†)k′k′ = δkk′UkU
†
k. (43)
However, we know that since Uˆ Uˆ† = 1ˆ, the block entries of Uˆ Uˆ† are given by identity matrices I along the
diagonal, and by 0 otherwise. This means that (Uˆ Uˆ†)kk′ = δkk′I, and equating this expression with (43)
yields UkU
†
k = I. This is just the condition for the unitary of the matrix Uk.
35
To conclude this section, we note that there is no reason why the various block entries of Uˆ should not be
equal to one another. Under the action of such an operator, all blocks of our ordered basis would evolve in the
exact same manner. In this case, given an initial state of the system S, the states of S in the superposition
produced by the action of Uˆ will be independent of the initial state of M . So in fact, an operator Uˆ for
which the block entries U i are the same or almost the same could be said to correspond to the most useful
sort of memory, since this constraint means that the evolution of S is hardly effected by the coupling to M .
However, for our analysis, we will still consider the general case with nonidentical block entries of Uˆ , since
an interaction of some system with a memory need not leave that system completely undisturbed.
3.2 Probabilities in the quantum model
In analogy with our analysis of the classical urn model, we now wish to understand how observation of the
quantum memory system M at one time allows for inference about the state of the system S at another
time. To this end, we describe the systems M and S primarily in terms of density operators, as opposed to
the state vectors that we have been working with until now. An overview of the density operator formalism
is given in Appendix B. This approach is useful in our present context for two reasons. First, the density
operator description easily accommodates a probabilistic analysis of the state of S. A general density operator
encodes not only probabilities arising from fundamental quantum indeterminism, but also probabilities which
are assigned based on a lack of exact information about a system. Second, it allows us to describe the systems
M and S in terms of two separate mathematical objects, namely each system’s reduced density operator.
This is not possible when working with state vectors alone, since if M and S become entangled, a state vector
can only be meaningfully assigned to the composite system M × S.
To begin, suppose that at some reference time t1, the composite system M ×S is in some separable state,
so that the total density operator ρˆ(t1) = ρˆ = ρˆ
M ⊗ ρˆS for M ×S is simply the tensor product of the density
operators ρˆM and ρˆS , corresponding to the systems M and S respectively. While the state of S is described
by some unknown density operator ρˆS , we assume that M is in a known pure state ρˆM = |m0〉M 〈m0|M .
Now, under the evolution described in the previous section, the composite system M × S will evolve
into a new state ρˆ(t2) = Uˆ ρˆUˆ
† by some second time t2. Suppose now that a measurement of the quantum
number associated with the memory system M is made, so that M collapses back into a new pure state
|m〉M 〈m|M . Given the initial pure state ρˆM = |m0〉M 〈m0|M of M and the evolution operator Uˆ , we would
like to understand how the measurement of M at t2 informs any inference we can make about the possible
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entries of ρˆS , and therefore the state of S, at t1.
Our first task is to calculate how the density operator ρˆ will evolve between t1 and t2. This evolution will
look simplest in the ordered basis given in (36). From the analysis in the previous section, we know that Uˆ
takes a block diagonal form in this basis. We can obtain the entries of ρˆ in this basis as follows. First, we
expand our definition ρˆ = ρˆM ⊗ ρS in terms of basis states of M and S, yielding
ρˆ = ρˆM ⊗ ρˆS = |m0〉M 〈m0|M ⊗
∑
j,j′
ρSjj′ |j〉S〈j′|S
 = ∑
j,j′
ρSjj′ |m0〉|j〉〈m0|〈j′|. (44)
Here, the coefficients ρSjj′ ≡ 〈j|M ρˆS |j′〉M are the entries of ρˆS in the {|j〉S} basis. However, we also know
that we can expand ρˆ as the sum of the reordered basis states
ρˆ =
∑
i,i′,j,j′
(ρii′)jj′ |i, j〉〈i′, j′| =
∑
i,i′,j,j′
(ρii′)jj′ |i+ f(j)− f(j0)〉|j〉〈i′ + f(j′)− f(j0)|〈j′|. (45)
Just as we expressed the entries of Uˆ in terms of the block matrices U ii′ , we define (ρii′)jj′ ≡ 〈i, j|ρˆ|i′, j′〉
as the entry at row j and column j′ of the block matrix ρii′ . In terms of these block entries, the density
operator is represented as:
ρˆ ∼

ρ00 ρ01 . . . ρ0,N−1
ρ10 ρ11 . . . ρ1,N−1
...
...
. . .
...
ρN−1,0 ρN−1,1 . . . ρN−1,N−1

(46)
Now, after equating terms in (44) and (45) with the same values of j and j′, we find the relation
ρSjj′ |m0〉〈m0| =
∑
i,i′
(ρii′)jj′ |i+ f(j)− f(j0)〉〈i′ + f(j′)− f(j0)|. (47)
Comparing the terms of this sum with ρSjj′ |m0〉〈m0|, we can now see that the only nonzero term will be
that for which m0 = i+f(j)−f(j0) = i′+f(j′)−f(j0). This means that if these equalities are satisfied, then
we simply have (ρii′)jj′ = ρ
S
jj′ . Otherwise, we must have (ρii′)jj′ = 0 if the appropriate terms are to vanish.
Symbolically, our result is:
(ρii′)jj′ = ρ
S
jj′δm0,i+f(j)−f(j0)δm0,i′+f(j′)−f(j0). (48)
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Now that all the entries of ρˆ in our ordered basis have been specified, determining the evolution of ρˆ is
just a matter of computing the product Uˆ ρˆUˆ†. Our goal is to calculate the individual entries of this product,
((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′)ββ′ ≡ 〈α,β|Uˆ ρˆUˆ†|α′,β′〉, where α and α′ take on the integer values from 0 to NM − 1, and β
and β′ are in the indexing set J. As an intermediate step, we first compute the block entry of Uˆ ρˆUˆ† at row
α and column α′, denoted (Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′ . As noted previously, this computation has the exact same form as a
standard matrix multiplication, but with the individual entries given as matrices instead of single numbers.
Proceeding this way, we obtain the result
(Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′ =
∑
k,l
UαkρklU
†
lα′ = Uαραα′U
†
α′ , (49)
where the sum collapses to a single term because of the block diagonal form of Uˆ , which ensures that U ii′ = U i
is the zero matrix unless i = i′. Proceeding to the computation of ((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′)ββ′ , we find that
((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′)ββ′ = (Uαραα′U
†
α′)ββ′ =
∑
k,l
(Uα)βk(ραα′)kl(U
†
α′)lβ′ . (50)
Noting that (U
†
α′)lβ′ = (Uα′)
∗
β′l, where ∗ denotes complex conjugation, and substituting our expression for
(ρii′)jj′ given in (48), our final expression for ((Uˆ ρˆUˆ
†)αα′)ββ′ is
((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′)ββ′ =
∑
k,l
(Uα)βkρ
S
klδm0,α+f(k)−f(j0)δm0,α′+f(l)−f(j0)(Uα′)
∗
β′l. (51)
Given these entries for the evolved density matrix, we can now evaluate the probabilities P (m|ρˆS) of
obtaining various values m when the measurement of M is made at t2. As described in Appendix B, these
probabilities are given by P (m|ρˆS) = Tr
[
PˆmUˆ ρˆUˆ
†
]
, where the operator Pˆm is the projection operator onto
the space of states of M with quantum number m, and the symbol Tr denotes the trace operation. In this
case, the basis state |m〉M is the unique state described by this quantum number, so Pˆm is simply |m〉M 〈m|M .
The trace of |m〉M 〈m|M Uˆ ρˆUˆ†, expressed as a sum over the original basis states, is given by
P (m|ρˆS) = Tr
[
|m〉M 〈m|M Uˆ ρˆUˆ†
]
=
∑
i,j
〈i|M 〈j|S
(
|m〉M 〈m|M Uˆ ρˆUˆ†
)
|i〉M |j〉S . (52)
Given the orthogonality of the basis states {|i〉M}, the terms in this sum are zero unless i = m, and so we
have
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P (m|ρˆS) =
∑
j
〈m|M 〈j|SUˆ ρˆUˆ†|m〉M |j〉S . (53)
Now, the matrix Uˆ ρˆUˆ†, expressed in terms of its entries ((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′)ββ′ , takes the form:
Uˆ ρˆUˆ† =
∑
α,α′,β,β′
((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′)ββ′ |α,β〉〈α′,β′|, (54)
Uˆ ρˆUˆ† =
∑
α,α′,β,β′
((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα′)ββ′ |α+ f(β)− f(j0)〉M |β〉S〈α′ + f(β′)− f(j0)|M 〈β′|S . (55)
Upon substituting this expression for Uˆ ρˆUˆ† into the equation for P (m) in (53), we note that the only
non-vanishing terms will be those for which m = α+ f(β)− f(j0) = α′ + f(β′)− f(j0) and l = β = β′, due
to the orthogonality of the basis states associated with both M and S. Thus we are left with
P (m|ρˆS) =
∑
j
((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)m−f(j)+f(j0),m−f(j)+f(j0))jj. (56)
This probability only depends on the diagonal entries of Uˆ ρˆUˆ†. From (51), we can see that these entries take
the values
((Uˆ ρˆUˆ†)αα)ββ =
∑
k,l
(Uα)βkρ
S
klδm0,α+f(k)−f(j0)δf(k),f(l)(Uα)
∗
βl. (57)
Here, we have replaced the product δm0,α+f(k)−f(j0)δm0,α′+f(l)−f(j0) in (51) with δm0,α+f(k)−f(j0)δf(k),f(l),
since for α = α′ these quantities are equal. Finally, substituting (57) into our expression for P (m|ρˆS) in (56),
with α = m− f(j) + f(j0) and β = j, we find the result
P (m|ρˆS) =
∑
j,k,l
(Um−f(j)+f(j0))jkρ
S
klδm0,m+f(k)−f(j)δf(k),f(l)(Um−f(j)+f(j0))
∗
jl. (58)
Now, collecting the terms with common values of ρSkl, we have:
P (m|ρˆS) =
∑
k,l
∑
j
(Um−f(j)+f(j0))jk(Um−f(j)+f(j0))
∗
jlδm0,m+f(k)−f(j)δf(k),f(l)
 ρSkl, (59)
P (m|ρˆS) =
∑
k,l
a
(m)
kl ρ
S
kl. (60)
We have defined the coefficient a
(m)
kl as the sum over j in parentheses in (59). So, we see that the
probability P (m) is a linear combination of the entries of ρˆS , the initial density operator of the system S.
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The coefficients a
(m)
kl are known to us, since they depend on the entries of Uˆ , the form of f(j), and the value
of m0, all of which we assume are given. Given this expression P (m|ρˆS), which encodes our knowledge about
the measurement of M at the time t2, we can now ask how about how this conditions any inference we can
make about ρˆS , which describes the state of S at the time t1.
Since ρˆS is a density matrix, this already places some constraints on the values of its entries. First, ρˆS is
necessarily a Hermitian operator, and therefore has fewer independent degrees of freedom than an arbitrary
complex operator. To see this, let us assume for simplicity that the matrix representation of ρˆS is a finite
N × N matrix. In order to be Hermitian, this matrix must have N real diagonal entries, and N(N − 1)/2
independent complex values in off-diagonal entries. This means that ρˆS is described by N +N(N − 1) = N2
real values, each corresponding to an independent degree of freedom. This is half the degrees of freedom
available to a general complex N × N matrix. Second, the eigenvalues of ρˆS must all be real numbers
between zero and one, and they must sum to one. This constraint insures that the eigenvalues of ρˆS can
be interpreted as probabilities. Without any additional information, these two restrictions alone vastly
underdetermine the values of the entries ρSkl. The task of assigning these entries in the most appropriate
way, given such constraints, constitutes a matrix completion problem. For the purposes of our inference, the
solution to this problem is also informed by the sum (60), which relates the matrix entries to one another in
terms of the known coefficients a
(m)
kl and the probability P (m|ρˆS).
So far, we have only just begun to consider our quantum memory model from the standpoint of a matrix
completion problem. One way to analyze this problem may be through a Bayesian updating procedure. In
this case, the aim is to make the best inference about the values of the matrix elements of ρˆS . We begin
with a prior distribution P (ρˆS) over the possible values of the entries ρSkl, conditioned by our knowledge
that ρˆS is a density operator, as well as by any relevant prior information about the systems M and S.
Then, after a particular value m of the memory quantum number is obtained in a measurement, we use this
value to update our prior distribution over the possible matrix entries, to obtain a posterior distribution
P (ρˆS |m). Here, the role of the likelihood function is played by P (m|ρˆS), since it encodes the probability of
a measurement outcome conditioned on knowledge of ρˆS . Expressed in this form, the memory inferences in
our quantum model appear quite analogous to the inferences in the classical urn model.
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4 Conclusions
In our analysis, we have attempted to bring out the role of inference in the functioning of physical systems
as memories. Any system is capable of interacting with its environment, and when it does so, information
about the state of the world is encoded in its internal degrees of freedom. However, this information may be
recorded in an unpredictable way, dispersed throughout a set of practically inaccessible degrees of freedom,
or quickly scrambled by further environmental influence. Fortunately, in some special cases, the coupling of
a system to its surroundings in a regular way allows for predictable correlations between certain properties
of the system and certain aspects of the environment. If these correlations can be harnessed to make precise,
informative inferences about the state of the world at one time, given observation of some property of the
system in question at another time, then we say then the system functions as a memory.
In the case of our classical urn model system, we have carried through an analysis of inferences about
the marble distribution between urns, given the output of a coupled memory device at a different time.
This has allowed us to understand how such memory inferences depend on the thermodynamic arrow of time
associated with the the marble system. Specifically, we find that inferences about the low-entropy past, given
information from the relatively high-entropy future, are much more informative in general than inferences in
the reverse direction. For our quantum model, although more work still needs to be done, we have developed
a framework for understanding how measurements of a quantum memory register allow inferences to be made
about a system coupled to the register. We have shown that such inferences can be couched in terms of a
matrix completion problem, where the entries of the density matrix of the coupled system must be inferred
based on the outcome of a measurement of the memory.
This work builds on that of Mlodinow and Brun in two key ways. First, as we have previously argued,
a definition of memory in terms of inference allows us to make sense of Mlodinow and Brun’s notion of
“generality.” For Mlodinow and Brun, a memory system satisfies generality if it still functions as a memory
under certain perturbations of the state of the memory’s environment; these perturbations may correspond
to a range of different possible recorded values. We can then say that such a memory aligns with the ther-
modynamic arrow of time if “typical” evolutions of the memory under these perturbations all exhibit similar
changes in entropy. However, to understand which possible evolutions of the memory and its surroundings
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are most likely to occur, and therefore most typical, we have to be able to pose some inference about the
how the memory will interact and evolve over time. To specify such inferences in a regular and quantitative
manner, we have applied the formalism of Bayesian inference in the context of memory systems.
Second, we have begun to extend this reasoning to quantum systems. In Mlodinow and Brun’s paper,
the systems which they consider are explicitly classical: The states of both the memory system and its
environment are described by points in classical phase space, which precisely specify the positions and
velocities of all the constituent parts of these systems. This state of affairs no longer obtains in a quantum
memory system. Importantly, the quantum states of a memory system and its environment will generally not
be specifiable individually, but only as an entangled quantum state of the composite system composed of the
memory and its surroundings. As Mlodinow and Brun point out, their argument assumes that the memory
and its environment are separable, in the sense that the state of each system can be specified individually.
However, the interactions between two quantum systems which encode information about one system in the
degrees of freedom of the other will generally entangle these systems, so that a state vector cannot be assigned
to the systems individually. So in the quantum realm, this assumption of separability must be dispensed
with. Nevertheless, we ultimately hope to show that this assumption is not critical to the thrust of Mlodinow
and Brun’s argument.
Given these developments in our work, several possible paths are left open for further study. The most
obvious next step is to complete our investigation of the quantum memory system. This would entail an
analysis of the matrix completion problem that we described at the end of Chapter 3, in order to determine
the most reasonable entries to assign to the density matrix for the system S, given a measurement of the
memory system M . Another direction of future research might then involve considering the von Neumann
entropy of the quantum memory system and its surroundings. We would like to show, as we have for the
urn model, that changes in the entropy of the memory and its surroundings over time condition the possible
inferences that can be made about these systems. Finally, it may prove fruitful to generalize the classical
results obtained with our urn model. This would involve describing the memory inferences about a classical
system more abstractly, without reference to any particular system like the urn model. Our analysis of the
urn model was useful because of the simple probabilistic calculations that it permitted, but approaching the
problem in more general terms may highlight the essential structure of our arguments.
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5 Appendix A: Bayesian Probability Theory
Bayesian probability theory, in the form developed by authors such as E. T. Jaynes, is a mathematical
prescription for assigning degrees of belief to various inferences, or claims about the world made on the
basis of relevant information. These degrees of belief, which quantify the extent to which inferences are
supported by the given evidence or information available, are expressed as probabilities between 0 and 1.
The standard rules of probability theory allow these degrees of belief to be manipulated and compared. In
particular, the Bayesian approach to Bayes’ rule of conditional probability is a method by which degrees of
belief may be systematically updated, given the existence of new information. This “Bayesian updating”
procedure is especially relevant for our analysis of memory systems, since it can be used to understand how
inferences about the state of some observed system can change upon access to some “memory” device that
is coupled to it. In this appendix, we present an overview of three important concepts in Bayesian theory:
The interpretation of probability statements, the Bayesian updating method, and the assignment of “prior”
or baseline probabilities. This presentation is guided by the writings of E. T. Jaynes concerning Bayesian
probability, particularly his book Probability Theory: The Logic of Science.6
We begin with a brief note on the meaning of probabilities in Bayesian theory. Bayesian probabilities, as
degrees of belief, are not empirical quantities. This interpretation of probabilities may be unfamiliar to some
readers, who are accustomed to understanding probability as the frequency with which a given event occurs,
relative to some set of other possible outcomes. In such “frequentist” accounts of probability, probabilities
are estimated based on the real or hypothetical frequencies of specific events, and then manipulated with the
mathematical rules governing probabilities. In contrast, a Bayesian probability is assigned to an inference as
the result of a logical procedure, which takes as inputs the information relevant to making that inference. In
this way, probabilities in the Bayesian formalism are not facts or properties of the world, but rather a metric
by which inferences can be quantified and then compared.
However, although the probabilities employed in Bayesian logic are not empirical quantities, they are also
more than just subjective judgments or beliefs of some human observer. First of all, Bayesian probabilities
cannot be assigned arbitrarily, but must obey both the standard rules of probability and a standard of
logical consistency. In some cases, a careful imposition of such constraints can single out a unique set of
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probabilities as the correct assignment for a given inference. In such situations, the resultant probabilities
are completely objective or “user-independent” in the sense that there is only one way to assign them in a
logically consistent manner. In fact, Cox’s Theorem, first proved in Richard T. Cox’s 1961 work Algebra of
Probable Inference, is discussed extensively in the first two chapters of Jaynes’ book. This theorem proves
that under very general assumptions, any self-consistent method for assigning numerical values to degrees
of belief about analytic statements of the form “A is true,” can be mapped to standard probability theory.3
Here, A can be a proposition like “A = The mass of the electron is X,” or “A = G is a human,” or any
proposition which can be assigned a definite binary truth value.
Second, the notion of inference employed in Bayesian theory does not rely on the existence of some human
agent or observer who can formulate inferences. Rather, since Bayesian inference is a clearly defined logical
procedure, it might be instantiated in all sorts of physical processes, from the cognitive processes of animals
to the bit operations of computers. The dynamics of such processes carry out the inference as a type of
computation or sequence of logical operations; no human intervention need be invoked. To emphasize this
very point, Jaynes even introduces a hypothetical “inference robot” in the first chapter of his book, which
demonstrates how each logical step in Bayesian probability theory can be precisely formulated and then
automated.
Given this approach to probabilities, we can now explain how Bayesian probabilities are assigned. The
procedure of assigning probabilities is conventionally divided into two steps: The assignment of initial prob-
abilities, called “prior probabilities”, and the updating of these probabilities based on new information or
evidence. We will first discuss the Bayesian updating procedure, and then conclude with a short explanation
of prior probabilities.
To introduce the Bayesian updating procedure, we first must define some basic notation. Consider
two claims A and B, which are propositions about the world. Specifically, these claims must be analytic
statements, i.e. they obey the Law of the Excluded Middle. They are either true or false. Typically, these
will be claims of as-of-yet undetermined truth value, such as statements about the future. Now suppose we
would like to assign a probability to the claim B, conditioned on the fact that A is given to be true. We
denote this probability as
P (B|A). (61)
All probabilities we will consider will take this form. Specifically, in the Bayesian formalism it is meaning-
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less to define probabilities like P (A), that is, the probability that A is true given no background information.
Any statement A about the world with any content always presupposes certain conditions, at least enough
to make the meaning of the statement intelligible. The notation P (B|A) makes this conditioning explicit.
The one rule of probability we will need to derive the Bayesian updating method is the rule governing joint
probabilities, or probabilities associated with more than one proposition being true simultaneously. Suppose
we wish to assign a probability to the claim that two statements A and B are both true, given a statement
C. If we denote this joint claim as (A,B), then this probability is expressed simply as P (A,B|C). The rule
for assigning joint probabilities like P (A,B|C) is as follows. First, we compute the probability of one of the
claims, for example A, given that C is true. Then, we compute the probability that the second claim B is
true, assuming that C and the first claim A are true. The joint probability is then given by the product of
these two probabilities,
P (A,B|C) = P (B|A,C)P (A|C). (62)
Note that this probability could equally be expressed as P (A,B|C) = P (A|B,C)P (B|C), since the joint
statement (A,B) is symmetrical: (A,B) is the same as (B,A). By equating these two expressions for
P (A,B|C) and solving for P (A|B,C), we arrive at Bayes’ Theorem, expressed as
P (A|B,C) = P (B|A,C)
P (B|C) P (A|C). (63)
The method of Bayesian updating can now be expressed simply in these terms. Suppose that, given some
background information encoded in a set of statements I, we have formulated some inference H, which we
will call the hypothesis. We wish to associate a probability with this inference, given that the information I
and some additional claim E are true. We call this statement E the evidence, and interpret it as some new
information which has been acquired. Given these definitions and Bayes’ Theorem in (63), the probability
of interest P (H|E, I) can be expressed as
P (H|E, I) = P (E|H, I)
P (E|I) P (H|I). (64)
Now, it becomes clear why we have referred to this method as an “updating” procedure. (64) tells us
that, given some initial assignment of a probability to our hypothesis H, expressed as P (H|I), we can then
reassess this probability upon consideration of the new information provided by the evidence E. This updated
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probability is given by P (H|E, I). In Bayesian terminology, the various terms in this updating procedure
are typically described as follows:
• P (H|I): The prior probability. This represents the best assessment of the hypothesis, without any of
the information expressed in the additional evidence E. Prior probabilities can be assigned in various
ways, depending on the specific nature of the prior information I; a few of these methods will be
touched on later.
• P (H|E, I): The posterior probability. Obtaining this value is the goal of our updating procedure, as it
corresponds to a new assessment of the hypothesis based on the additional evidence E.
• P (E|H, I): The likelihood. This probability must be computed in order to evaluate the posterior,
assuming some prior is already assigned. One way to interpret this factor is to consider the hypothesis
H as corresponding to some model about the world. P (E|H, I) then expresses the probability that the
given evidence E is obtained, given that the model expressed by H is a valid one.
• P (E|I): The normalization. This factor must also be assigned a value in order to compute the posterior.
However, the normalization is usually not computed directly, but is instead fixed by the constraint that
the probability of H and its logical negation must sum to 1.
Given the posterior probability in terms of these values, the only remaining obstacle to implementing
a Bayesian updating procedure is to specify a prior probability. The particular method of assigning this
prior will depend on the nature of the hypothesis and prior information at hand, and in general there is not
a single universal method for assigning priors. However, with certain types of prior information, invoking
certain criteria of logical consistency can greatly constrain the possible priors which may be assigned. A few
of these potential constraints are described briefly below.
One criterion for assigning prior probabilities is the Principle of Indifference. This principle states that,
given N possible hypotheses Hi = H1, H2... HN , if the given prior information does not distinguish them
in any way except for their labeling, then equal probabilities ought to be assigned to each hypothesis:
P (Hi|I) = 1/N . This principle can be useful in cases when each possible outcome can be expressed in terms
of some base set of possibilities, each of which can be assigned an equal probability. Another method is to
invoke symmetry considerations. For example, if a hypothesis H concerns some physical system which has
rotational symmetry, then any probability assignment associated with this system should assign identical
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values to statements which are indistinguishable up to a rotation of the system. One other approach,
pioneered by Jaynes, is the “Maximum Entropy” principle. This criterion identifies the prior distribution with
the probability distribution that maximizes the Gibbs entropy defined in (1), with respect to any constraints
on the probabilities given in the prior information. With no constraints on the probability distribution, and
a finite number of possible outcomes, the Maximum Entropy principle assigns the same probabilities as the
Principle of Indifference.
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6 Appendix B: The Density Matrix Formalism
In this appendix, we develop the concepts and mathematics behind the density matrix formulation of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. The advantages of the density matrix formalism are twofold. First, it
permits a natural treatment of quantum systems in a statistical mixture of states, that is, systems which are
in an indefinite state not due to intrinsic quantum indeterminism, but because of uncertainty in the system’s
preparation. Second, the density matrix formalism allows for a useful description of individual subsystems
of an entangled quantum system. The framework developed in this appendix is primarily drawn from the
textbook Entangled Systems: New Directions in Quantum Physics, by Ju¨rgen Audretsch.1
The appearance of randomness in the standard account of quantum mechanics is well known. In general,
the value of a quantum observable cannot be predicted with certainty prior to measurement: Only proba-
bilities can be assigned to the various possible outcomes. Despite this fundamentally stochastic character
of quantum systems, in quantum theory a definite state is nevertheless assigned to an isolated quantum
system at all times. This is the state vector |ψ〉, which encodes the probabilities of obtaining various possible
measurement outcomes from the system. In quantum mechanics, knowledge of the state vector amounts to
the most complete description possible of a quantum system, although it does not deterministically dictate
the results of measurement outcomes.
However, a description of a quantum system may also require probabilities for another reason, independent
of the indeterministic foundation of quantum physics. This can occur when the system under consideration
has been prepared in one of a set of possible states, but it is not known which one. We refer to this ensemble
of possible states as a statistical mixture, or simply a mixed state. In such situations, although the system
might be described by a single state vector in principle, without further interaction with the system this
exact state cannot be specified. However, under these circumstances, it may be useful to assign a probability
to each possible state in the mixture, which expresses the likelihood that the system is actually in that
particular state. This is where the density matrix formalism becomes useful: It offers a compact description
of the possible quantum states in a statistical quantum, along with their corresponding probabilities. As
we will demonstrate later, the density matrix description can also be employed in the analysis of entangled
quantum systems, for which it is impossible to meaningfully assign a definite state vector to either entangled
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subsystem.
To begin building the density matrix picture of quantum mechanics, we first consider the special case in
which a quantum system does in fact have a definite state vector. In contrast to mixed states, in this case
we say that the quantum system is in the pure state |ψ〉. We will assume that this vector is normalized. We
define the density operator associated with such a pure state as the outer product of the state vector |ψ〉 and
its adjoint, 〈ψ|,
ρˆ ≡ |ψ〉〈ψ|. (65)
This operator encodes the same probabilities concerning measurement outcomes as the state vector, but
in a way which generalizes to the description of statistical mixtures in a straightforward manner. To see
this, suppose there exists some quantum observable associated with the system under consideration, with a
corresponding operator Qˆ. Each possible outcome of a measurement of this observable will be an eigenvalue
of Qˆ. We denote the ith potential measurement outcome as qi, where the index i ranges over some set of
integer values. In terms of the state vector, the Born rule states that the probability P (qi) of obtaining a
given outcome upon measurement is given by P (qi) = 〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉, where Pˆi is the projection operator onto
the space of eigenvectors of Qˆ with eigenvalue qi. We can express this probability in terms of the density
operator by taking the operator trace, denoted with the symbol Tr, of P (i). Given any orthonormal basis
{|j〉} = {|1〉, |2〉...} for the Hilbert space of the system under consideration, where the index j ranges over a
set of integer values, the trace operation on a operator Oˆ takes the form
Tr
[
Oˆ
]
=
∑
j
〈j|Oˆ|j〉. (66)
This operation leaves P (qi) unchanged, since the trace of a single number is just that number itself, and
so P (qi) = Tr
[
〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉
]
. Now, by noting that the trace of a product such as 〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉 is invariant upon
cyclic permutations of the factors, we can write P (qi) as
P (qi) = Tr
[
〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉
]
= Tr
[
Pˆi|ψ〉〈ψ|
]
= Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
]
. (67)
As a result of such a measurement, the state vector will collapse to an eigenvector of Qˆ corresponding
to the outcome of the measurement, qi. Specifically, the state vector after measurement is obtained by
applying the projection operator Pˆi to the pre-measurement state vector, and then dividing by the factor
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√
P (qi) =
√
〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉 for normalization. Symbolically, the state vector undergoes the evolution |ψ〉 → |ψ′〉 =
Pˆi|ψ〉/
√
〈ψ|Pˆi|ψ〉. The corresponding evolution for the density operator, from ρˆ to ρˆ′, is then given by
ρˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ| → ρˆ′ = |ψ′〉〈ψ′| = Pˆi|ψ〉√
P (qi)
〈ψ|Pˆ †i√
P (qi)
=
1
Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
] PˆiρˆPˆi, (68)
where Pˆ †i denotes the Hermitian conjugate of Pˆi. We have used the fact that Pˆi is Hermitian, or that Pˆi = Pˆ
†
i .
We can also consider how the density operator will evolve in isolation, in the absence of measurement. In
this case, the state vector evolves from |ψ〉 to |ψ′〉 = Uˆ |ψ〉, where Uˆ is some unitary operator determined by
the Hamiltonian of the system. Under this evolution, the adjoint of |ψ〉 evolves into 〈ψ|Uˆ†, and so we see
that corresponding evolution of the density operator takes the form
ρˆ = |ψ〉〈ψ| → ρˆ′ = |ψ′〉〈ψ′| = Uˆ |ψ〉〈ψ|Uˆ† = Uˆ ρˆUˆ†. (69)
Taken together, equations (67)-(69) describe the dynamics of a pure state, and the probabilities which it
encodes, in terms of operations on the density operator. To understand how these properties generalize to
the case of statistical mixtures, it is useful to first consider the measurement probabilities associated with a
mixed state. As described previously, mixed states occur when a quantum system is in one of some set of
definite states, but it is not known which one. For some given mixed state, we denote this set of possible
states as {|ψn〉} = {|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, |ψ3〉...}, where the index n ranges over some set of integer values. To describe
a mixed state, we assign a set of probabilities {pn} = {p1, p2, p3...} over the set of possible states, such that pn
gives the probability that the system is actually in the state |ψn〉. The best way to assign these probabilities
is contingent upon what is known about the preparation procedure which produced the quantum state. At
this stage, we will just take this set of probabilities as a given.
Now, a straightforward application of the rules of probability can tell us the probabilities of obtaining
the various values {qi} of the observable Qˆ. Suppose that upon measurement, the value qi is observed.
This result could have emerged in a number of ways. For example, the true state of the system prior to
measurement might have been given by |ψ1〉, and the measurement could have induced a collapse to a new
state Pˆi|ψ1〉/
√
〈ψ1|Pˆi|ψ1〉 with probability 〈ψ1|Pˆi|ψ1〉, as given by the Born rule and (67). Alternately, the
system could have collapsed to a new state Pˆi|ψ2〉/
√
〈ψ2|Pˆi|ψ2〉 from |ψ2〉, with probability 〈ψ2|Pˆi|ψ2〉. In
general, there will be as many different possible “paths” by which this measurement can occur as there are
states in {|ψn〉}, the set of possible initial states. Moreover, each one of these possibilities corresponds to a
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mutually exclusive event: The system is only ever truly in one quantum state, and only one of these possible
collapses occurs. The probability of obtaining some result from a set of mutually exclusive outcomes is simply
the sum of the individual probabilities of each event in the set. Therefore, if we define P (|ψn〉 and qi) as the
probability that the system began in state |ψn〉 and then the value qi is obtained, then the total probability
P (qi) of obtaining qi is the sum of these probabilities,
P (qi) =
∑
n
P (|ψn〉 and qi). (70)
Since each term in this sum is a joint probability of two separate events, we can express each term as
a product of probabilities, in accordance with (62) in Appendix A. Specifically, for each term, the joint
probability P (|ψn〉 and qi) is equal to the probability P (|ψn〉) that the system begins in the state |ψn〉,
multiplied by the conditional probability P (qi||ψn〉) that the value qi is obtained, given the initial state |ψn〉.
That is, we have
P (|ψn〉 and qi) = P (|ψn〉)P (qi||ψn〉). (71)
However, we have already seen the factors in this product. The first factor P (|ψn〉) is, by definition, equal
to the probability pn, since we defined each member pn of the set {pn} as the probability that the system
was prepared in the initial state |ψn〉. The second factor is given by the Born rule and (67): If the system
begins in the state |ψn〉, then a value qi will be obtained upon measurement with probability 〈ψn|Pˆi|ψn〉.
So, after substituting these results into (71), and then rewriting the sum in (70) in these terms, we find the
result
P (qi) =
∑
n
P (|ψn〉)P (qi||ψn〉) =
∑
n
pn〈ψn|Pˆi|ψn〉. (72)
That is, the total probability of obtaining the result qi in a measurement of Qˆ is the sum of the Born
probabilities of observing this result for each possible initial state |ψn〉, weighted by the probabilities pn.
Given this expression for P (qi), to understand how the density operator might be defined for the case of
mixed states, we can ask: How should our original definition of ρˆ in (65) be generalized to statistical mixtures,
so that the probabilities P (qi) take the same form Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
]
as in the pure state case? We can answer this
question by manipulating our expression for P (qi) in (72) as follows:
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P (qi) =
∑
n
pnTr
[
〈ψn|Pˆi|ψn〉
]
=
∑
n
pnTr
[
Pˆi|ψn〉〈ψn|
]
= Tr
[
Pˆi
(∑
n
pn|ψn〉〈ψn|
)]
. (73)
So, we see that if we define that density operator as ρˆ =
∑
n pn|ψn〉〈ψn| for mixed states, then the
probabilities P (qi) are still given as Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
]
, just as for pure states. Therefore, we take this as the definition
of the density operator in the general case, for a statistical mixture with possible states {|ψn〉} and associated
probabilities {pn}:
ρˆ ≡
∑
n
pn|ψn〉〈ψn| =
∑
n
pnρˆn. (74)
Here, we have introduced the notation ρˆn ≡ |ψn〉〈ψn| to denote the density matrix associated with the pure
state |ψn〉. The density operator for a mixed state is then simply a weighted sum of the density matrices for
the pure states in {|ψn〉}. For a pure state, all of the probabilities in the set {pn} vanish except for one, and
this general definition reduces to the original definition given in (65).
After defining the density operator in this way, we find that the evolution of mixed states also takes the
same form as the pure state case, for both evolution due to measurement and unitary evolution when the
system is isolated. We have already noted that the system will, in the course of a measurement with value
qi, evolve into some state of the form Pˆi|ψn〉/
√
〈ψn|Pˆi|ψn〉, with the value of n dependent on the initial
pre-measurement state:
|ψ〉 → |ψ′〉 ?= Pi|ψ
1〉√〈ψ1|Pi|ψ1〉 , Pi|ψ
2〉√〈ψ2|Pi|ψ2〉 ... (75)
Therefore, the post-measurement density operator, in accordance with the definition given in (74), will
be given by a weighted sum of the density operators for these possible states. In this case, the appropriate
weight for each term |ψ′〉〈ψ′| = PˆiρˆnPˆi/Tr
[
Pˆiρˆn
]
is the probability that the system collapsed into this state,
given that a measurement of qi was obtained. But this is just the probability that the system started
in |ψn〉, given the measurement result qi, since there is only one state in the mixture that could evolve
into Pˆi|ψn〉/
√
〈ψn|Pˆi|ψn〉. If we denote this probability as P (|ψn〉|qi), then the post-measurement density
operator ρˆ′ is given by
ρˆ→ ρˆ′ =
∑
n
P (|ψn〉|qi) PˆiρˆnPˆi
Tr
[
Pˆiρˆn
] = ∑
n
P (|ψn〉|qi)
P (qi||ψn〉) PˆiρˆnPˆi. (76)
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On the right side of this expression, we have noted that the expression Tr
[
Pˆiρˆn
]
is just P (qi||ψn〉), the
probability of the measurement outcome qi, given the initial state |ψn〉. By invoking Bayes’ Theorem, given
in (63) in Appendix A, we can rewrite the ratio of probabilities in each term as follows:
P (|ψn〉|qi) = P (qi||ψ
n〉)
P (qi)
P (|ψn〉) =⇒ P (|ψ
n〉|qi)
P (qi||ψn〉) =
P (|ψn〉)
P (qi)
=
pn
Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
] . (77)
Substituting this into (76), we find that
ρˆ→ ρˆ′ =
∑
n
pn
Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
] PˆiρˆnPˆi = 1
Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
] Pˆi(∑
n
pnρˆn
)
Pˆi =
1
Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
] PˆiρˆPˆi. (78)
This is exactly the same form as the evolution of a pure state under measurement, as given in (68).
Last, we can look how a density operator for a mixed state evolves when the system under consideration is
isolated. Given a mixed state with a density operator ρˆ =
∑
n pn|ψn〉〈ψn| =
∑
n pnρˆn, there are a number
of different ways that the system might evolve, depending on the true initial state |ψn〉 that the system
occupies. Specifically, the state |ψ1〉 will evolve to Uˆ |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 will evolve to Uˆ |ψ2〉, and so on. Therefore, in
general, after the evolution the system will be in the state Uˆ |ψn〉 with probability pn. This means that the
corresponding evolution of the density operator is given by
ρˆ→ ρˆ′ =
∑
n
pnUˆ |ψn〉〈ψn|Uˆ† = Uˆ
(∑
n
pn|ψn〉〈ψn|
)
Uˆ† = Uˆ ρˆUˆ†. (79)
So again, this evolution takes the same form as in the pure state case. We now see that the formulas
(67)-(69) governing the probabilities and dynamics associated with the density operator are equally valid for
both pure states and statistical mixtures, given that the density operator is defined as in (74). This is what
makes the density operator formalism useful in the context of statistical mixtures: The density operator
alone can fully encode both the set of possible states {|ψn〉} in a statistical ensemble, and the corresponding
set of probabilities {pn}.
The other useful application of the density matrix formalism that we will discuss here occurs when
a quantum system cannot be described by a single state vector |ψ〉, not because of a preparation which
generates a statistical ensemble, but because the system of interest has become entangled with another
system. In this case, although a state vector cannot be assigned to the state of the individual systems, we
will find that a density operator can be associated with each system that captures all the relevant probabilities
and dynamics for that system.
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To develop the density matrix formalism for entangled systems, let us consider the general form of a
density operator for a composite system. Consider two subsystems A and B, which form a composite system
A × B. Suppose we can find some orthonormal basis {|i〉A} = {|1〉A, |2〉A, |3〉A...} for the Hilbert space
associated with A, and another basis {|j〉B} = {|1〉B , |2〉B , |3〉B ...} for the Hilbert space of B. For both
bases, the indices i and j range over some set of integers, possibly infinite. In this case, a basis for the
Hilbert space of the composite system is given by {|i〉A ⊗ |j〉B}, where the indices i and j range over all
possible combinations of their values in the bases {|i〉A} and {|j〉B}. Here, the expression |i〉A⊗|j〉B denotes
the tensor product of |i〉A and |j〉B , which we will write more concisely as |i〉A|j〉B or |i, j〉.
Once we have chosen this basis, a general density operator ρˆ which describes the composite system A×B
can be expanded as a sum of outer products of the vectors in this basis,
ρˆ =
∑
i,i′,j,j′
ρij,i′j′ |i〉A|j〉B〈i′|A〈j′|B =
∑
i,i′,j,j′
ρij,i′j′ |i, j〉〈i′, j′|. (80)
Here, the coefficients ρij,i′j′ of this expansion are given simply as ρij,i′j′ = 〈i, j|ρˆ|i′, j′〉, since we have expanded
ρˆ in terms of an orthonormal basis. These are the matrix elements of ρˆ in the basis {|i, j〉}.
However, there are many cases where we would like to focus our analysis on one subsystem or the other,
without handling the full density matrix ρˆ. For example, we may be considering measurements of the system
A alone, or measurements or observables which are local to A. A local observable for A has an operator Qˆ
of the form
Qˆ = QˆA ⊗ 1ˆB = QˆA ⊗
∑
j
|j〉B〈j|B
 , (81)
where QˆA is the operator for this observable in the Hilbert space for the system A. To construct the
corresponding operator Qˆ for this observable in the complete Hilbert space for the composite system A×B,
we must take the tensor product of QˆA with the identity operator 1ˆB =
∑
j |j〉B〈j|B for the Hilbert space
of B. The form of local operators implies that they will have the same set of eigenvalues as the lower-
dimensional operator from which they were constructed. That is, Qˆ has the same eigenvalues as QˆA, and
these eigenvalues correspond to the set of possible measurement outcomes associated with these operators. In
addition, the projection operator Pˆi, which projects onto the space of eigenvectors of Qˆ with the eigenvalue
qi, takes the simple form
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Pˆi = Pˆ
A
i ⊗ 1ˆB = PˆAi ⊗
∑
j
|j〉B〈j|B
 . (82)
Here, PˆAi is the projection operator for QˆA in the Hilbert space for the system A alone. So, we construct
the projection operator Pˆi from Pˆ
A
i in the same way that we construct Qˆ from QˆA. Given this form for
local operators and their associated projection operators, we can now examine how measurements of local
observables are carried out, and compute the corresponding probabilities. This will lead us to a method for
constructing a density operator associated with the subsystem A alone.
Like any observable, the probabilities associated with the possible measured values of Qˆ are given in (67)
as
P (qi) = Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
]
= Tr
[
(PˆAi ⊗ 1ˆB)ρˆ
]
. (83)
However, since the projection operator Pˆi = Pˆ
A
i ⊗ 1ˆB in this expression factors due to the locality of the
observable Qˆ, we can express this probability in a special form, in terms of a density operator for A alone.
To do this, we first reexamine the trace operator, as defined earlier in (66). In the orthonormal basis {|i, j〉}
that we have selected for the composite system, the trace of some operator Oˆ is given by
Tr[Oˆ] =
∑
i,j
〈i, j|Oˆ|i, j〉 =
∑
i
〈i|A
∑
j
〈j|BOˆ|j〉B
 |i〉A. (84)
On the right hand side of this expression, we see that the trace of an operator in the Hilbert space of the
composite system A×B can be thought of as two separate operations: A sum over the basis states associated
with the B subsystem, followed by a sum over the basis states for the A subsystem, or visa versa. These
operations are defined as the partial traces over the degrees of freedom of B and A, respectively. That is,
the partial trace TrA
[
Oˆ
]
of Oˆ over the degrees of freedom of A is defined as
TrA
[
Oˆ
] ≡∑
i
〈i|AOˆ|i〉A. (85)
TrB [Oˆ] is defined in an analogous way. We can now take the complete trace of Oˆ by applying the partial
traces over the individual subsystems in either order, so that Tr
[
Oˆ
]
= TrA
[
TrB
[
Oˆ
]]
= TrB
[
TrA
[
Oˆ
]]
.
We can use this decomposition of the trace operator to rewrite our expression for P (qi) in (83) as follows,
P (qi) = TrA
[
TrB
[
(PˆAi ⊗ 1ˆB)ρˆ
]]
= TrA
∑
j
〈j|B(PˆAi ⊗ 1ˆB)ρˆ|j〉B
 . (86)
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Now, note that since PˆAi is an operator on the Hilbert space associated with A alone, it is unaffected by
the products with the basis vectors |j〉B of the Hilbert space of B, and therefore can be taken out of the sum
over j. This allows for the simplification
P (qi) = TrA
PˆAi
∑
j
〈j|B 1ˆB ρˆ|j〉B
 = TrA
PˆAi
∑
j
〈j|B ρˆ|j〉B
 = TrA[PˆAi TrB[ρˆ]]. (87)
In this manipulation, the tensor product symbol ⊗ is dropped after the projection operator PˆAi is taken
outside the sum, since the sum over j is not an operator on the Hilbert space of B, but simply a number.
In addition, we drop the identity operator 1ˆB , since by the definition of the identity operator we have
〈j|B 1ˆB = 〈j|B . Given this expression for P (qi), we can now usefully define the reduced density operator ρˆA
associated with the subsystem A as
ρˆA ≡ TrB
[
ρˆ
]
. (88)
After substituting this definition into (87), the probabilities P (qi) take the form
P (qi) = TrA
[
PˆAi ρˆ
A
]
. (89)
So, for observables which are local to the subsystem A, the reduced density matrix ρˆA encodes the
probabilities associated with measurement outcomes in exactly the same way as density matrices for a lone
quantum system. That is, for a given ρˆA, to compute the probability of a measurement result qi, we apply the
appropriate projection operator PAi , and then take the trace of the result. Only now, after tracing over the
degrees of freedom of B to obtain ρˆA, this computation is done entirely within the Hilbert space associated
with A. In addition, during a local measurement on the subsystem A, the reduced density operator ρˆA
evolves in the same way as a density operator of a full system. We can see this by tracing over the degrees
of freedom of B in equation (68), in the particular case of a local observable where Pˆi = Pˆ
A
i ⊗ 1ˆB :
TrB
[
ρˆ
]
= ρˆA → ρˆA′ = TrB
[
1
Tr
[
Pˆiρˆ
] PˆiρˆPˆi] = TrB [ 1
TrA
[
PˆAi ρˆ
A
] (PˆAi ⊗ 1ˆB)ρˆ(PˆAi ⊗ 1ˆB)
]
, (90)
ρˆA → ρˆA′ = 1
TrA
[
PˆAi ρˆ
A
] PˆAi TrB[ρˆ]PˆAi = 1
TrA
[
PˆAi ρˆ
A
] PˆAi ρˆAPˆAi . (91)
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Again, this is just as in the case of an single isolated system: To obtain the post-measurement density
operator, we apply the projection operator PˆAi to either side of the initial density operator ρˆ
A, and then
normalize by dividing by the factor P (qi) = TrA
[
PˆAi ρˆ
A
]
.
Of course, for non-local measurements, and for the evolution of A in the absence of any interaction
external to A × B, the evolution of ρˆA will be more complicated. This is because these processes depend
on the state of the subsystem B and its interactions with A in a nontrivial way. However, working with ρˆA
can still be a useful tool for understanding the information encoded in the subsystem A alone, in terms of
the probabilities P (qi) associated with making various local measurements on A. In particular, the reduced
density operator allows us to understand how interaction with B produces an effective statistical mixture
of the possible states of A. This is because although the subsystems A and B might begin in individual
pure states ρˆA and ρˆB , in which case the density operator factorizes as ρˆ = ρˆA⊗ ρˆB , a nontrivial interaction
between A and B will generally evolve the system so that the new reduced density operators ρˆA′ and ρˆB ′
each correspond to mixed states. This is the content of entanglement: After interaction, neither reduced
density operator can be associated with a single state vector, but only an ensemble of possibilities.
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